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Since 1994, the wars between the Russian military and Chechen
nationalist forces have resulted in "butchery and savagery on a scale and
intensity recalling World War 11.,,1 An estimated 100,000 persons may
have been killed so far, the vast majority being civilians? In relation to
other international crises, the conflict in Chechnya has been largely muted
in the press, and the international community's reaction has been to
marginalize the conflict as an "internal matter" of Russian affairs. 3 In
January 2003, for the first time, the Strasbourg-based European Court of
Human Rights (ECIIR or the Court) declared six petitions alleging the
commission of human rights violations by Russian forces in Chechnya
admissible. This Article examines the Court and its human rights case law
as a potentially significant mechanism for the enforcement of human rights
* University ofNebraska Public Policy Center (IDIMPH-University ofIowa). I would like
to thank Thomas Barrett (St. Mary's College of Maryland), Diederik Lohman (Human Rights Watch),
Kirill Koroteev (Memorial), Patrice McMahon (University of Nebraska), Matt Moehr (University of
Nebraska), and Nur Azura Yacob for their insight and assistance in developing this Article. The views
represented are mine alone. Please note that works cited in this Article employ different versions of
non-English names, for example "Gromy" and "Gromyi" or ''Chechnya'' and "Chechnia," etc.
I. Barry Renfrew, Chechrrya, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE PuBLIC SHOULD KNow 68,68
(Roy Gutman & David Rieffeds. 1999).
2. Numerous estimations about the death toll in Chechnya exist, but due to the circumstances
of the war, they have been difficult to verify. In the first half year of the war alone, Knezys and
Sedlickas state that "about 40,000" people were killed. STASYS KNEZYS & ROMANAS SEDLICKAS, THE
WAR IN CHECHNYA 179 (1999). In a congressional hearing approximately six months into the war in
1995, Senator A1fonse 0'Amato declared Chechnya a "mass grave for at least 25,000 people." Hearing
on Chechrrya: Hearing Before the Comm'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., l04th Congo 29 (1995)
(statement of Sen. A1fonse 0'Amato, Co-Chairman, Corom'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur.). By the
end of the first period of war alone, in 1996, the oft-cited figure of approximately 100,000 deaths was
provided in a variety ofintemational news sources. E.g., David Filipov, Talks at Stake in Chechen Vote
Today, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 27, 1997, at A2 (estimating "[t]he war cost between 30,000 and 100,000
lives, most of them civilians"); Leonid Radzikhovsky, Chechrrya's First Defeat, RUSSIAN PRESS DIG.,
Aug. 26, 1997 (asserting that the Chechen war of 1994-96 "claimed 100,000 lives"), available at
LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File; Robin
Shepherd, Chechen Woman Kills 18 in Bus Suicide Bombing, TIMES (London), June 6, 2003 (describing
a suicide bomb attack near Chechnya and asserting that "the attack highlights the intractable nature ofa
conflict that has raged for almost a decade and claimed more than 100,000 lives"), available at 2003
WL 62040832; Martin Sieff, Mystery, Rumor Surround Moscow Bombings, UNITED PRESs INT'L, Sept.
16, 1999, (asserting that the 1994-96 period of war "cost 100,000 lives"), available at LEXlS, News &
Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File.
3. See infra notes 120--23, 205-13 and accompanying text discussing the international
community's reaction to the wars in Chechnya.
   Abdel-Monem in Vermont Law Review (2003-2004) 28. 
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and redress in a war that has generated minimal interest on the international
stage.
Part I of this Article provides a brief historical background to the
current situation in Chechnya. It outlines a descriptive history of Chechnya
and its experiences through the Tsarist and modem eras until its declaration
of independence following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Part II
outlines documented reports of alleged human rights violations committed
by Russian forces in Chechnya since 1994. Reported violations include the
commission of (A) torture of persons, including rape; (B) forced
"disappearances" of civilians; and (C) presumed extrajudicial killings of
civilians by Russian forces. Part III provides a descriptive outline of the
ECHR based in Strasbourg. It examines the Court and its role as the
Council of Europe's judicial body charged with upholding the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. Part N reviews (A) the lack of an effective international
response to human rights violations in Chechnya; and (B) the claims in
Khashiyev v. Russia and Akayeva v. Russia, the first cases deemed
admissible by the Court charging Russian forces with committing human
rights violations in Gromy in 2000.
Part V of this Article proceeds to examine previous ECHR case law
involving facts and claims applicable to the human rights situation in
Chechnya. Many, but not all of these cases, stem from military operations
conducted by Turkish forces against Kurdish separatists in the early-mid
1990s. Particular aspects of the Court's holdings examined in these cases
include its treatment of (A) the obligation imposed by Article 2 of the
European Human Rights Convention to investigate deaths of individuals
resulting from the alleged use of fatal force by government agents; (B) the
obligation imposed by Article 3 of the European Convention to protect
individuals held in government custody; (C) principles involving the
exhaustion of domestic remedies for redress and the availability of an
effective domestic remedy for aggrieved parties seeking investigation of
alleged human rights violations; and (D) the development of Court case law
involving the establishment of presumptions of custody and death in
"forced disappearance" cases. Part VI concludes this Article with a review
of how the ECHR may treat claims of human rights abuses evolving from
the conflict in Chechnya. This development will hopefully provide some
fonn of justice for Chechen victims of war crimes committed by Russian
forces and deter ongoing abuses in the Republic of Chechnya.
2004] Chechnya's Last Chance?
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Chechnya 4 is positioned within and to the north of the Caucasus
mountain range between the Caspian and Black seas, in an extremely
diverse region with multiple ethnicities and linguistic groups. S Greater
Chechen society has historically been organized into extended clans
following patrilineal lines tied to particular geographic locations.6 Clans
traditionally formed the basis of group identification patterns and served as
the primary political, land-holding, and economic unit.7 Historical tribal
allegiances and affiliation to land geographically isolated or separated from
surrounding ethnic groups have created very strong indigenous loyalties and
a disdain for the imposition of outside authority.8
Chechen religious identity has developed over centuries. Eastern
Christian churches have strong ties to the Caucasus region-which remain
in Armenia and Georgia. 9 Islamic areas further north in contemporary
Chechnya and other enclaves have origins dating back to the initial expanse
of Islam to the region by Arabs in the eighth century.IO Evidence exists
suggesting that some inhabitants of present-day Chechnya were at one point
nominally Christian during the Middle Ages, II suggesting that the North
4. "Chechnya" is derived from the Russian word for the village in which "Chechnyans" were
first encountered by the Russians. MOSHE GAMMER, MUSLIM REsiSTANCE TO TIlE TSAR: SHAMIL AND
THE CONQUEST OF CHECHNIA AND DAGHESTAN 18 (1994). The self-proclaimed name for the Russian
Chechen Republic is the Republic of Ichkeria, which is named after the ancestral tribe of its first
independently elected leader General Jokhar Dudayev. See JOHN B. DuNLOP, RUSSIA CONFRONTS
CHEcHNYA: ROOTS OF ASEPARATIST CONFLICT 20 (1998). The Chechens have historically referred to
themselves as "Nochchi." KNEzYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note 2, at 9.
S. See SEBASTIAN SMITH, ALLAH'S MOUNTAINS: POLITICS AND WAR IN TIlE RUSSIAN
CAUCASUS 7 (1998) (noting that among the region's estimated population oftive million people, there
may be between forty to a hundred different groups).
6. GAMMER, supra note 4, at 19-20 (discussing a "nomadic-patriarchal" social organization
common to the Chechens and other groups inhabiting the Caucasus); KNEzYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note
2, at 10 (discussing Chechen social organization and estimating that some 165-170 Chechen clans
remain in modem times).
7. See ANNA ZELKINA, IN QUEST FOR Goo AND FREEDOM: THE SUFI REsPONSE TO TIlE
RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS 14-18 (2000) (discussing general principles of social
organization in the North Caucasus region, including the Vaynakh-the ethnic group from which modem
day Chechens originate).
8. GAMMER, suPra note 4, at 21 (noting a strong historical aversion to "any authority external
to the tribe or clan" among North Caucasus groups).
9. See KNEZYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note 2, at 12 (noting the traditions of Christianity in the
Caucasus region).
10. See ZELKINA, supra note 7, at 26-28 (discussing the first wave of Islamic influence in the
Caucasus region beginning in the eighth century).
I I. Ross Marlay, Chechen, in AN ETHNOHISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE RUSSIAN AND
SOVIET EMPIRES 146, 146-47 (James S. Olson ed., 1994) (stating that "remains of medieval stone
churches indicated that some Chechens were once Christians"); ZELKINA, supra note 7, at 28-29 (noting
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Caucasus, and Chechnya, were focal points for successive encounters
between Christianity and Islam. In Chechnya, Sunni Islam gradually
became the dominant religion. 12 For many centuries, however, hybrid
practices developed in the area reflecting the process of Islamization and a
continuing persistence of practices stemming from Christianity or other
religious beliefs. 13 It was not until major military encounters between
Russian expansionist forces and the Chechens, and other peoples of the
region, began occurring in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that
Sunni Islam developed and consolidated in a more orthodox fashion. This
development of religious identity served as an expression of group
resistance to Russian rule. 14
the gradual process of Islamization in the area, and clash with Christianity and other religions, including
Judaism and Zoroastrianism); see also THOMAS M. BARRETT, AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE: THE TEREK
COSSACKS AND THE NORTH CAUCASUS FRONTIER, I 70{}-1 860, at 18{}-82 (1999) (describing mixtures
of belief among various ethnic groups in the North Caucasus and the Cossack settlers who located
there).
12. See ZELKINA, supra note 7, at 28-29 (outlining Islamic expansion in the area).
13. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 3 (asserting that a "mixed Islamic-animist" hybrid existed in
Chechnya until the nineteenth century); ZELKINA, supra note 7, at 29 (noting how thirteenth century
Muslim tombstones featured Christian names); id. at 33-35 (outlining accounts of varied religious
practices in the North Caucasus and estimates of when Islamic influence expanded); id. at 37-39 (noting
a syntheses of Islam and animist beliefs in the North Caucasus before the nineteenth century).
14. In one observer's commentary, the consolidation of Islam in the area was a reaction to
Russian military intervention and its attempt to exert influence through proxy rule:
Thus the religious revival in Daghestan coincided with the Russian conquest; the
infidel neighbour became the foreign oppressor, and to the desire for spiritual
reformation was added the yet stronger desire for temporal liberty. The Russians,
moreover, made the cardinal mistake of confirming and supporting with their
moral prestige, and by force of arms when necessary, those native rulers who, in
reliance on such backing, oppressed more than ever their unhappy
subjects.... The law of Muhammad, on the other hand, proclaimed equality for
all Mussulmans, rich and poor alike; the new teaching was therefore essentially
popular, and from this time onward Muridism was a political movement ....
JOHN F. BADDELEY, THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF THE CAUCASUS 237 (Russell & Russell eds., 1969)
(1908). Strict adherence to orthodox Islamic law was prominent during the mid-nineteenth century
under the Chechen military and religious leader Shamil. See GAMMER, supra note 4, at 232-38
(discussing the religious dimension to Shamil's Chechen nation and its relationship to the resistance
against Russian forces).
The particular form of Islam in which the early Chechen, anti-Russian movement took
form around, was a variantofisiamic Sufism called the Naqshbandiyya. See id. at 39-40 (discussing
the Central Asian origins of the Naqshbandiyya-Kha/idiyya); ANATOL LIEVEN, CHECHNYA:
TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER 36{}-62 (1999) (discussing variants of Sufism and associations with
political movements as well as the Naqshbandiyya in Chechnya). The Naqshbandiyya movement in
Chechnya took root largely under the influence of Mansour at the end of the eighteenth century. See
ZELKINA, supra note 7, at 58-63.
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Russian encroachment into the Caucasus likely began as part of a
gradual migration by Cossacks into the area. IS Although Cossack
movement into the Caucasus may have initially been without intentional
design, the Tsars of Russia would eventually seize upon their gradual
settlement in the northern plains of Chechnya and other parts of the region
as part of a strategy to extend their geographic sphere of influence.16 For
Russia, maintaining a hold on the Caucasus was important to consolidate
access to the Caspian and Black Seas and southern trade routes, and served
as a physical buffer against the rival Ottoman and Persian Empires.17 In the
early eighteenth century, Peter the Great launched a major invasion through
the area to push back Persian influence and secure coastland around the
Caspian Sea. 18 Catherine the Great continued a policy directed at
expanding Russian settlements in the area and establishing military control
of the Caucasus. 19 A religious dimension also existed in Russian
expansionist policy. Tsarist intervention in the region was welcomed by
Christian Georgia, surrounded to the south, east, and northeast by Islamic
15. See BADDELEY, IfUpra note 14, at 3-5 (positing the origins of the Cossacks and their role in
establishing settlements south of Russia, serving as a "vanguard" for gradual expansion of the Russian
empire); UEVEN, supra note 14, at 304-06 (discussing the Cossacks and early encounters with
Chechens).
16. See LIEVEN,lfUpra note 14, at 305 (noting the service of Cossacks with the Russian Anny
and their expansion into O1echnya).
17. See SMITH, supra note 5, at 36 (outlining early Russian initiatives into the Caucasus in the
sixteenth century); ZELKlNA,lfUpra note 7, at 52-53 (discussing the geopolitical importance of the North
Caucasus for Russia and other nations).
18. BADDELEY, supra note 14, at 23-31 (describing Peter the Great's campaign against the
Persians); ZELKINA, IfUpra note 7, at 52-55 (outlining Russian military operations in the North Caucasus
against both Persia and the Ottoman Turks). Disputes between Iran and Russia still persist in regards to
Caspian Sea-area oil. See Kamyar Mehdiyoun, International Law and the Dispute over Ownership of
Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Sea, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 179, 179-88 (2000) (outlining the
positions of Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and other nations on Caspian Sea rights); Faraz Sanei, The
Caspian Sea Legal Regime. Pipeline Diplomacy. and the Prospectsfor Iran's Isolation from the Oil and
Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran's Legal Options with its Geopolitical Realities, 34 VAND. J.
1'RANSNAT'L L. 681, 763-70 (2001) (discussing Soviet and Iranian treaties on commercial rights in
regards to Caspian Sea oil). As Smith notes, an early Russian interest in consolidating a Persian route
through the Caucasus and around the Caspian Sea was to secure access to India SMITH, supra note 5, at
36. Fear of Russian encroachment towards India eventually led to British-Russian tensions throughout
Central Asia, often referred to as "the Great Game." See Wendy Palace, Afghanistan and the Great
Game, 33 AsIAN AFF. 64, 64-67 (2002) (discussing British interests in Afghanistan and its fear of
Russian control). British-Russian tensions also led to direct conflict in the Crimean War in 1854, and at
one point the British attempted to work with the Chechen independence leader Shamil against their
common enemy. See GAMMER, supra note 4, at 272-73.
19. See BADDELEY, supra note 14, at 32-33 (noting Catherine the Great's policy on the
Caucasus and the establishment of a Russian fort at Mozdok); BARRETT, IfUpra note II, at 38-40
(discussing the strategy of converting and settling the North Caucasus area during Catherine the Great's
reign).
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Turkey, Chechnya, and present-day Shiite Azerbaijan.20 An ideology of
religious conflict manifested, as the Russians actively sought to convert
Muslims to Christianity in the region and banned Islamic practices in areas
where they had authoritative power.21 In this context, Russian conquest of
the Islamic Caucasus would occur "only when the Cross [was] set up on the
mountains and in the valleys and when temples for Christ the Saviour
replaced the mosques.,,22 In tum, perhaps the first moderate-sized anti-
Russian rebel movement was led by a Chechen Sheik who declared an
Islamic holy war against the Russians in the latter part of the eighteenth
century.23
Large-scale Russian campaigns into the Caucasus, which ultimately
resulted in Chechnya's conquest, began in the early nineteenth century once
Russia was able to tum its attention from its war against Napoleon back to
its southern border. 24 In 1816 the Russians appointed a governor for
Georgia and the Caucasus who intended to bring .the region into the larger
empire and subjugate non-Russian nationalist aspirations. 2S Extreme
brutality was used-the perceived otherness of the Chechen and Muslim
peoples in the region contributed to a Russian ideology justifying the use of
military force to establish control and influence in an area populated by
what they perceived as an alien groUp.26 The Russians also employed a
policy of appointing native proxy governors in local communities, who at
times used their authority to appropriate wealth for personal gain and
otherwise abuse their administrative powers.27
20. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 13 (noting how Georgia's incorporation into Russia created
an imperative based on religious affiliation to protect it from its surrounding Muslim nations).
21. See GAMMER, supra note 4, at 44 ("[T)he Russian policy was indeed anti-Muslim. The
repeated efforts to spread (Orthodox) Christianity among the mountaineers would alone suffice to
demonstrate this face of Russian policy. These were reinforced by measures restricting Muslim
religious practice, the one to cause the greatest uproar being the prohibition to perform the hajj ....").
22. Id. (citing a Russian source).
23. SMITH, supra note 5, at 38-39 (discussing Sheik Mansur and his campaign against the
Russians); ZELKlNA, supra note 7, at 58-68 (discussing Sheik Mansur and his influence on future
iterations ofChechen anti-Russian movements).
24. LIEVEN, supra note 14, at 306 (outlining the beginning of Russia's Caucasus policy in the
nineteenth century following the defeat ofNapoleon).
25. See GAMMER, supra note 4, at 29-32 (discussing the strategic plans of Aleksei Ermolov,
Governor and ChiefAdministrator ofGeorgia and the Caucasus).
26. See id. at 34-35 (citing Ermolov as saying "[g]entleness, in the eyes of Asiatics ... is a
sign of weakness, and out of pure humanity I am inexorably severe"); SMITH, supra note 5, at 42-43
(discussing Ermolov's policy to either pacifY or annihilate villages in the region). The historical legacy
ofEnnolov's policies has been profound. Several alleged attempts were made to destroy his statue in
Gromy since 1969, and it was fmally destroyed in 1991 after the Chechens declared independence from
the Russian Republic. LIEVEN, supra note 14, at 307.
27. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 25 (noting the system of appointing inspectors or "prislavy"
whose "arbitrary acts served to enrage the Chechens").
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o
These policies contributed to the eventual appearance of an Islamic
holy man, Shamil, who cultivated enough popular support to declare
another holy war against the Russians in the 1830s. 28 This movement
unified several Islamic peoples in the region into a military force that
successfully employed guerrilla war tactics against the Russian army. 29
Shamil's initial military triumphs were so successful he was celebrated in
the anti-Russian British press as ''the Lion of Dagestan,,30 and memorialized
in Leo Tolstoy's works. 31 Eventually, the Russians began employing a
large-scale depopulation policy designed to empty Chechnya's northern
plains, push Chechens to the south, and consolidate Russian controlled
territory. 32 Without substantial support from the British, Turks, or
Iranians,33 the Russians finally deployed tens of thousands of soldiers freed
from duty following the end of the Crimean War into the Caucasus. 34
Military victory was achieved, and an estimated 600,00~1,000,000 Islamic
peoples in the Caucasus were deported and replaced by Russian settlers.Js
The forced migration was particularly painful for the Circassians. Of
24,700 Circassians forced into Turkey, the Russians estimated 19,000 died
of diseases.36
28. SMITH, supra n~ 5, at 43 (noting Shamil's appointment as Imam in 1834).
29. ld at 43-44; LIEVEN, supra note 14, at 308 (citing accounts of house-to-house fighting
between Shamil's forces and the Russians); ZELKINA, supra note 7, at 181-88 (outlining the military
encounters between Shamil and the Russians).
30. SMITH, supra note 5, at 44.
31. Tolstoy continually refers to Shamil in Hadji Murad, based on the real defection of one of
Shamil's soldiers to the Russians. LEO TOLSTOY, Hadji Murad, in 2 COLLECTED SHORTER FiCTION
605,605-738 (Louise Maude et aI. trans., 2001). Tolstoy himself served in the Russian Anny in the
Caucasus during the 18505 and also served in the Crimean War. He is regarded as being critical of
Russian imperialism in the region. Ofthe Cossack settlers in the Caucasus, he wrote:
[l1his petty population of Christians, barricaded in a little comer of the world,
surrounded by semi-civilized Mahometan tribes and by soldiers, regards itself as
having attained the highest degree of culture, looks on the Cossack as alone
worthy of the name of man, and affects to despise every one [sic] else.
LYOFN. TOLSTOI, The Cossaclcs, in THE COSSACKS, SEVASTOPOL, THE INVADERS AND OTHER STORIES
1,20 (Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1899).
32. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 27-28 (outlining Ermolov's mass deportation policy in the
18405 and '50s).
33. GAMMER, supra note 4, at 257~3 (outlining the relationship between Shamil and other
nations and the lack of support for any military intervention in the Caucasus).
34. ld. at 277 ("[B]y the summer of 1856 the decision was reached to use the 200,00Q-man
army in the Caucasus to crush Shamil and then subdue the Circassians while the impact caused by the
peace treaty of Paris lasted.").
35. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 29-30 (outlining estimates ofChechens and Circassians believed
to have been forced to Turkey as a result of Russian ethnic cleansing policy).
36. ld at 30. According to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation in The
Netherlands, there are presently three million Circassians living in fifty nations, and only ten percent of
people in Circassia are ethnic Circassians. UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORO., CIRCASSIA,
at http://www.unpo.org/members/circassia.htm (last visited Dec. 2,2003).
244 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 28:237
(;>
Continuous, smaller uprisings among the Chechens took place
following the Tsarist conquest after the Crimean War.37 In the disarray
accompanying the end of World War I and the communist revolution,
Chechens and other groups declared the formation of an independent
state--the "North Caucasus state" or "Mountain Republic"-which was
recognized by Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey.38 The Red Army
forcibly occupied Chechnya and Dagestan/9 and the communists promised
the creation of a largely autonomous Soviet Mountain Republic for
Chechnya and other areas, blending Soviet and Islamic or indigenous
themes.40 However, when the communists instead began implementing the
collectivization policies in the region, the Chechens and others in the
Caucasus rose again in rebellion, and ajihad was declared but put down by
the Red Army. 41 Eventually, a Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic (ASSR) was created in 1936.42 The formation of the
Chechen-Ingush ASSR, administrative decisions made by the communist
leadership in regards to manipulating borders, and other internal policies
facilitated a strategic Russification policy.43 For instance, the communist
leadership banned written Arabic and travel to Mecca and restricted other
religious practices.44
Developments during World War II, with Nazi Germany's invasion of
the Soviet Union, set the stage for another extremely brutal mass
deportation of Chechens in subsequent years. In the wake of Stalin's
37. GAMMER, supra note 4, at 293-94 (noting uprisings in 1863 and 1877-78).
38. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 3~37 (discussing developments during the Russian revolution
and the creation ofan independent nation in which Arabic and Turkish would be used).
39. ld. at 42.
40. ld. at 42-43 (discussing the creation of the Soviet Mountain Republic which had "a Soviet
emblem on its banner but it had a shariat coostitution").
41. See id. at 49-5 I (discussing the collectivization period during the 1930s and subsequent
revolt).
42. ld. at 46.
43. ld. at 46-49 (discussing the communist "divide and rule" policy in which borders of soviets
were constantly altered in order to dilute concentrations ofparticular ethnic groups within administrative
regions). As noted by Conquest:
What happened in all these cases was that local unity was halted and the
administration ofeach area was linked direct to Moscow, so that there could be no
question of any joint opposition on party or governmental level against the
proposals of the Soviet Government, and no development of local solidarity in
any way. Moreover local cultural unities were broken up where they existed. The
idea of a unified Turkic language in Central Asia was greatly discouraged and
each local dialect was differentiated as far as possible from that of its neighbours,
while at the same time being Russianized.
ROBERT CONQUEST, THE NATION KILLERS: THE SOVIET DEPORTATION OF NATIONALITIES 37 (1970).
44. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 46-49 (discussing how the Latin alphabet was mandated, and
most religious schools were closed).
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collectivization policies, the Germans hoped to exploit anti-party
sentiments, particularly among non-Russians, during their invasion of the
Soviet Union as they headed south to capture the oilfields of Azerbaijan.4s
Despite German propaganda and strong antagonism to Russian and/or
Soviet policies after decades of mistreatment, few Chechens took up arms
against the Soviets. 46 On the contrary, during the German invasion
thousands of Chechens joined the Red Army voluntarily, some even
obtaining the status of genera1.47
Yet with the war ongoing, the communist leadership had already
decided to deport the Chechens from the region en masse. Prior to the
German invasion of the Soviet Union, there was a concern among Red
Army leadership that "the population of northern Caucasus would prove a
handicaf in case of war and recommended that 'special measures' be
taken.'04 The communist party thus decided to deport the entire Chechen
population to Central Asia, as well as Ingush, Crimean Tatars, Karachai,
Kalmyks, and other Caucasus or Black Sea peoples.49
Mass deportation was, of course, a commonly used policy by Soviet
authorities. Three million people or more are estimated to have been
forcibly relocated throughout the Soviet Union from the 1930s to 1950s.50
Close to half a million Chechens and Ingush were forcibly deported in
45. Id. at 58 ("Certainly, the Chechens and other mountaineers had reason enough to detest the
Soviet regime, and the Germans cunningly targeted these resentments, promising the mountaineers, for
example, full religious freedom and the opening of mosques, [and) the abolition of collective
farms ....").
46. Id at 59 (noting that "perhaps less than a hundred" Chechens fought with the Germans).
47. Id. at 60-61.
In October 1942, Chechens joined the thousands ofvolunteers who poured
out to help erect defensive barriers around the city of Gromyi, which was directly
threatened by the German advance....
Because they could not speak Russian and were forced to eat pork, as welI
as suffering other indignities, many Chechens chose to desert from the Red Army.
In March of 1942, the drafting of Chechens and lngush into the military was
discontinued. Five months later, however, in August 1942, a decision was made to
mobilize them on a voluntary basis....
According to archival documents of the USSR NKVD, 17,413 men joined
the Red Army as a result of these three voluntary mobilizations.... During the
time that they were permitted to serve in the Red Army, a number of Chechens
distinguished themselves by their bravery ....
Id. But see CONQUEST, supra note 43, at 100 (noting that the pro-Soviet fighters were not supported by
the indigenous populations of the region).
48. CONQUEST, supra note 43, at 99.
49. Id at 99-100 (discussing the decision to deport Chechens from the region, and listing the
ethnic grou~ deported and the general dates that the operations commenced).
50. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 61 (discussing the policy of deportation and alleged reasons
justifying the forced relocation ofpeoples).
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1944, virtually the entire population of the area at that time. 51 The
operation was planned secretly and was accomplished in a very short
amount of time. 52 Soviet NKVD agents committed numerous atrocities
during the deportation.53 Many forced onto overcrowded trains died from
infectious diseases, and the sick were intentionally denied medicine.54 The
Chechen-Ingush ASSR was officially removed as an administrative unit a
month after the operation began.55 After arrival in the Kazakh and Kirgiz
SSR's, thousands more died from starvation and disease.56 Historians have
estimated that during, or as a result of, the post-World War II deportation,
twenty percent or more of the North Caucasus population died, possibly
including close to one half of all Chechen people.57 Following Stalin's
death and Khrushchev's attack on party crimes under his rule, the Chechen-
Ingush ASSR was recreated in 1957,58 and Chechens were allowed to return
to their homeland.59
Coexisting with these historical grievances, a variety of contemporary
issues existed that contributed to Chechen antagonism towards Soviet
authority. Unemployment among Chechens in the late 1980s and early
1990s was estimated to be as high as a quarter or more of the working age
51. LIEVEN, supra note 14, at 319.
According to the most credible figures, 478,479 Chechens and Ingush were
loaded on to trains in February 1944; when Khrushchev publicly revealed what
had happened, 400,478 were later officially reported as having been deported-
which is a strong suggestion that the other 78,000 died en route or soon after they
were unloaded, freezing and starving, in the Kazakh steppe. Thousands never
made it to the trains at all. In half a dozen mountain villages, from where it was
difficult to move the population in mid-winter, the NKVD troops herded them
into mosques and bams and killed them all. Patients in hospitals were also killed.
Id. The NKVD or People's Commissariat ofIntemal Affairs was the Soviet secret police, the
precursor of the KGB. See William Flemming, The Deportation ofthe Chechen and Ingush
Peoples: A Critical Examination, in RUSSIA AND CHECHNIA: THE PERMANENT CRISIS:
ESSAYS ON RUSSo-CHECHEN RELATIONS 65 (Ben Fowkes ed., 1998).
52. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at6~5 (noting the secrecy and speed ofthe operation, and the
tactics used to deceive the local populace from the Soviet plans).
53. Id. at 65 (recounting how the population ofone village was ordered burned alive, as well as
other atrocities).
54. See id. at 68 (describing conditions aboard the "death trains" and the outbreak of typhus
during the train journey from the Caucasus to Central Asia).
55. See CONQUEST, supra note 43, at 144 (quoting Krushchev's Secret Speech of Feb. 1956 to
the 20th Party Congress wherein he noted that the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was "liquidated" in March
1944). For another examination ofthe mass deportation, see Flemming, supra note 52, at 65-86.
56. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 68-69 (describing living conditions for the resettled Chechens in
Central Asia).
57. Id. at 70.
58. CONQUEST, supra note 43, at 145 (noting the recreation ofthe Chechen-Ingush ASSR by a
decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet).
59. See LIEVEN, supra note 14, at 321-22 (describing accounts on the deportation and return of
the Chechens to Chechnya, where many Russians had been resettled).
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population.60 Many Chechens left to work as migrant laborers in Russia or
other republics, and some turned to criminal activities.61 There were also
striking disparities in the health services offered to ethnic Russians living in
Chechnya, and to Chechens themselves.62
The events leading to the formal declaration of independence and
ensuing war were intertwined with the wider development of affairs
occurring throughout the Soviet Union, beginning with Chairman
Gorbachev's declaration of the new perestroika and glasnost policies in
1987. 63 The Lithuanian legislature's formal proclamation of its
independence in March 1990 initiated the literal dissolution of the Soviet
Union.64 In the struggle for power between Gorbachev and Yeltsin prior to
the 1991 coup, advocating for greater autonomy and/or independence for
republics within the Soviet Union and Russia was frequently employed as a
means to gather political support. Yeltsin had to "disassociate the Russian
Federation from any subordination to the Soviet Union's
government. ... [S]upport from the Russian Federation's Autonomous
Republics had suddenly become very important.'>6S A Soviet law on the
"delimitation of authorities between the USSR and federative subjects," on
April 26, 1990, made autonomous republics of Russia administrative
60. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 85-86 (citing statistics on the "labor surplus" in the rural sector
of the Republic's economy).
61. Id at 86 (citing statistics on Chechens living outside of the Chechen-Ingush Republic).
The "Chechen mafia" has gained notoriety throughout Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent
States. See Tarik Abdel-Monem, Foreign Nationals in the United Stales Witness Security Program: A
Remedy for Every Wrong?, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1235, 1247 (2003) (noting the proliferation of
organized crime in the Commonwealth of Independent States). Russian policy towards Chechnya
emphasizes the purported existence of "Chechen mafia-type extremism" as part-justification for its
operations in the Republic. See Vladimir Mikheyev, How to Bring Peace 10 Grozny, RusDATA
DIALINE-RUSSIAN PREss DIGEST, SepL 28,2001, at I, available al LEXIS, News & Business, Countly
& Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File. As asserted by Ben Fowkes, the "claim that the
invasion of Chechnia was an effective way of fighting the criminal underworld also had good
propaganda value." Ben Fowkes, Introduction to RUSSIA AND CHECHNIA: THE PERMANENT CRISIS:
EsSAYS ON RUSso-CHECHEN RELATIONS I, 18 (Ben Fowkes ed., 1998).
62. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 87 (comparing statistics for the number of hospital beds and
physicians available for Russian areas ofChechnya and non-Russian areas).
63. See EDGAR O'BALLANcE, WARS IN THE CAUCASUS, 1990-1995, at 2-4 (1997) (describing
the implementation of policy reforms beginning under Gorbachev in the late I980s). O'Ballance
provides a concise history of the Gorbachev reforms, Yeltsin's rise in power, and dissolution of the
Soviet Union. See generally id. at 1-21.
64. See id. at 5 (detailing the break between the Lithuanian Republic and the Soviet Union on
March I I, 1990). The independence movement in the Baltic nations served to inspire Chechens such as
General Jokhar Dudayev, Chechnya's first President. While serving in the Soviet Air Force, Dudayev
was based in Estonia, and was sympathetic to the Estonian national movement. DUNLOP, supra note 4,
at 98. In 1989, Dudayev allegedly allowed the Estonian flag to be raised while commanding a Soviet air
force base in Estonia. O'BALLANCE, supra note 63, at 165.
65. KNEzVS&SEDLICKAS,supranote2,at 15.
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subjects of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin then declared the sovereignty of
Russia.66
Concurrent with these developments, Chechens began organizing a
forum to promote an agenda for independence. A National Congress for
Chechen peoples was established in November 1990, which elected General
Jokhar Dudayev as Chairman.67 Dudayev was an ethnic Chechen who had
risen through the ranks of the Soviet Air Force to command long-range
bombers armed with nuclear weapons, and eventually obtained the status of
general.68 In the summer of 1991, with events moving at a very fast and
uncertain pace throughout the Soviet Union, Dudayev declared that the
Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was no longer legitimate.69
During and immediately following the attempted communist coup in
Moscow in August,70 Dudayev openly voiced support for Yeltsin and
denounced the couJ)-a garnble--but a decision that would later increase
his public stature and moral authority once it became apparent the coup
would fail. 71 With clear knowledge that the USSR would certainly
dissolve, Dudayev and his troops then occupied several of the local
government agencies and facilities and declared a popular election for later
66. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 91 (discussing sovereignty and the control strategies between
the Soviet Union and Russia). Although examining the substance ofChechnya's right to independence
within the framework of customary or modem international law is not the focus of this article, a close
examination of the events of 1990-92 could offer much in terms of evaluating the international
community's formal recognition of Chechnya's sovereignty, or lack thereof. An argument previously
made is that Chechnya separated from Russia while it was still an administrative unit of the Soviet
Union, following which the Russian Federation treaty was created in 1992 and Chechnya declined to
join. See Luke P. Bellocchi, Note, Self-Determi1Ultion in the Case ofChechnya, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 183,
184-88 (1995) (analyzing the theory and experience of Chechnya's struggle to gain recognition as an
independent nation); Duncan B. Hollis, Note, Accounwbility in Chechnya-Addressing Internal Matters
with Legal and Political Intemotional Norms, 36 B.C. L. REv. 793, 799--802 (1995) (describing
Chechnya's struggle with Yeltsin for sovereignty). Thus, the argument follows, Chechnya separated
from Russia as an administrative unit of the Soviet Union, which then disbanded, and therefore Russia
as a separate entity had no legal right to hold Chechnya as a Russian Republic---Chechnya's declaration
of independence was made about a month before the United States and the European Community
recognized Russia on Christmas Day of 1991. With this argument in mind, the modem wars in
Chechnya are not internal matters, but an international conflict in which Russia has invaded a sovereign
nation--albeit one not formally recognized by the majority of the international community. The Soviet
law ofApril 26, 1990, supports this line of reasoning.
67. Q'BALLANCE, supra note 63, at 166.
68. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 97-99 (chronicling Dudayev's career and his role in the Chechen
independence movement).
69. Id. at 95 (discussing Dudayev's leadership role and initiatives as head of the executive
branch of the Chechen Congress).
70. Q'BALLANCE, supra note 63, at 6-11 (describing the Moscow coup and its failure).
71. See DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 100-01 (discussing Dudayev's support for the reformists
against the communist coup).
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in the year.n In late October, elections were held and some eighty-five to
ninety percent of the participating voters elected General Dudayev
President. 73 Days later, Dudayev officially declared Chechnya's
independence. Boris Yeltsin responded by declaring martial law and
sending the first contingent of Russian troops to Chechnya-initiating the
modem wars.74
II. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLAnONS IN CHECHNYA
Since the Chechen declaration of independence, the first major military
confrontations between Chechen and Russian forces took place in late
1994/5 following several years of failed negotiations and posturing by the
parties.76 The "first war" from 1994-96 caused the deaths of an estimated
40,000 civilians in the first six months alone77 and the displacement of an
estimated one-third of the entire population of the Chechen Republic. 78
Only six months after the engagement began, one Russian Duma official
openly acknowledged before U.S. congressional hearings that "[t]ens of
72. O'BALLANCE, supra note 63, at 166-67 (describing the anned take-over ofgovernment and
media offices following the failed August coup in Moscow).
73. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 114 (citing election statistics and asserting that eighty-five
percent of voters elected Dudayev); Mllrta-Lisa Magnusson, The Negotiation Process Between Russia
and Chechenia-Strategies, Achievements and Future Problems. in CONTRASTS AND SOLUTIONS IN THE
CAUCASUS 407, 410 (Ole Hoiris & Sefa Martin Yurukel eds., 1998) (citing statistics and asserting that
ninety percent of voting Chechens elected Dudayev). But see KNEzYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note 2, at 19
(noting that some non-Chechen districts within the Republic did not votl}-grounds used by Russia to
argue that the elections were invalid).
74. See O'BALLANCE, supra note 63, at 167~8 (discussing the elections, Russia's non-
recognition, and the dispatch of Russian troops to Chechnya).
75. For accounts of the days immediately prior to Russia's first major military campaign in
Chechnya, see LIEVEN, supra note 14, at I03--{)4 (describing accounts of Russian military convoys being
diverted and blocked by civilians prior to even entering Chechnya); id. at 105 (describing encounters
with Russian soldiers hesitant to enter the war).
76. DUNLOP, supra note 4, at 168-209 (outlining developments between 1992-94, involving a
series of failed negotiations, brinkmanship, the increasing influence of hardliners within the Russian
government, and the gradual movement towards anned conflict).
77. KNEZYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note 2, at 179-81 (citing estimates of deaths, casualties, and
numbers of displaced persons that occurred during the first war); see also Svante E. Cornell,
International Reactions to Massive Human Rights Violations: The Case ojChechnya, 51 EUROPE-ASIA
STUD. 85, 88 (1999) (''To illustrate the level of bombardment of Grozny, it has been calculated that an
average of over 4000 blasts were recorded per hour during the most intensive fighting. In Sarajevo,
which has set a kind of 'standard of horror' in the post-cold war era, the highest rate recorded was
800.").
78. See KNEzYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note 2, at 179-81 (providing an overview of death and
casualty figures during the first war); see also LIEVEN, supra note 14, at 43-45 (describing the author's
first hand impressions of the December 1994 bombings of Grozny).
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thousands of civilians have died in the course of the fighting.,,79 In the
same session, Senator Alfonse D'Amato called Chechnya "a mass grave for
at least 25,000 people .... Russia appears to have attempted to terminate
Chechnya's independence using the old methods that worked for the Czar
and for Joseph Stalin.',so
After a truce had ended the first period of fighting in late 1996,81 the
"second war" began in late 1999. Although the Chechen conflict had
largely been contained within the Republic or very near its borders,82 major
warfare started again in August 1999 following an incursion by Chechen
forces, some led by a Saudi commander, into neighboring Dagestan to join
forces with anti-Russian Dagestani separatists and allegedly consolidate an
Islamic state.83 The second period of warfare was also characterized by
indiscriminate Russian military operations and an increased trend by
Chechens of resorting to attacks or hostage takings within Russia proper.84
During the course of both wars, both the Chechen and Russian sides
have been responsible for grave violations of fundamental human rights,
but, some commentators have concluded that "responsibility for the main
body of human rights violations, nevertheless, lies with the Russian[s]."8s
79. Hearing on Chec1urya: Hearing Before the Comm'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur.,
l04th Congo 34 (1995) (statement ofSergei Kovalev, Member of the Russian State Ouma).
80. [d. at 29 (statement of Sen. A1fonse O'Amato, Co-chairman, Comm'n on Sec. and
Cooperation in Eur.).
81. KNEzYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note 2, at 294-304 (describing the period of negotiations that
led to a truce and cessation of ml!ior hostilities).
82. See ill. at 235 (noting two "military terrorist actions" in which Chechens stormed hospitals
and other civilian structures and took numerous hostages); see also Comell, supra note 77, at 87 (noting
how the Chechen side has "made itself guilty of hostage taking and terrorist acts on several occasions"
and outlining the attacks in the Russian Republic and Oagestan).
83. Francois Jean, Chechnya: Moscow's Revenge: The Human-Rights Debacle in Chec1urya,
HAIlv. INT'L R., 16, 17 (2000) (describing an attack in Dagestan by Chechens led by the Wahhabi
commander ofSaudi origin, Khattab).
84. As of the writing of this article in 2003, one of the most notorious, recent incidents took
place in October 2002 when Chechens took close to 700 people hostage in a Moscow theater and
demanded that Russia end its war and withdraw its forces from Chechnya. Vladimir Isachenkov,
Russian Special Forces Stonn Theater, Most Rebel Captors and 67 Hostages Killed, 750 Rescued,
Assoc. PREss, October 26, 2002, available at 2002 WL 102131731.
85. Cornell, supra note 77, at 87; see also, Troubling Trends: Human Rights in Russia:
Hearing Before the Comm'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur., 107th Congo 30 (2001) (statement ofSen.
Ben Campbell, Chairman, Comm'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur.) ("The discovery of dozens of
bodies in a mass grave near the main Russian military base in Chechnya is only the most egregious
horror in a long line of horrors being visited upon non-combatants in that region."); id. at 32 (prepared
statement of Congressman Christopher Smith) ("I think we all understand that guerrilla warfare can be
savage, and there have been documented instances of atrocities committed by Chechen forces.
However, Russia military actions in Chechnya suggest less of a military operation against an armed
secessionist forces--or an 'anti-terrorist operation,' as Moscow phrases it-than a war against an entire
people who are its own citizens.");
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Neglect for human rights, in a statement by the Council of Europe's
Parliamentary Assembly President, is also coupled with a "deplorable lack
of willingness" by the appropriate Russian authorities to investigate such
abuses. 86 Although it is extremely difficult to gauge estimates of the
number of individuals killed in Chechnya since 1994, Senator Gordon
Smith asserted that in the 1994-96 war alone, over 100,000 Chechens were
killed as a result of indiscriminate Russian military operations, out of a
population of approximately one million Chechens. 87 This may have
included the use of chemical weapons by the Russian military.88 Beyond
Russia's disastrous war in Chechnya saw butchery and savagery on a scale and
intensity recalling World War II....
Russian estimates of deaths during the twenty-one-month war range up to
90,000, mostly civilians. Some 600,000 people, half the population, fled or were
driven from their homes. Both sides committed atrocities, although the far larger
Russian military was guilty of the worse excesses. Russian troops
indiscriminately attacked towns and villages, killing and raping civilians,
pillaging and burning homes. Chechen fighters executed prisoners and civilian
opponents, used civilians to shield their forces and military installations, and
drove Russian civilians out ofChechnya in a systematic campaign.
Renfrew, supra note I, at 68-69;
I fully recognise the complexity of the internal problems stemming from concern
at the serious crimes committed against innocent civilians in Dagestan following
the armed incursions there, the crimes of kidnapping, murder and cruel actions of
the Chechen rebels, and the need to COlDlter terrorist activities. Nevertheless, the
primary responsibility for addressing human rights violations, as recognised
internationally, rests with the Russian authorities and I firmly believe it requires a
sustained, effective national response.
Situation of Human Rights in Chechnya in the Russian Federation, Report by the High
Commissionerfor Human Rights Mary Robinson, U. N. Commission on Human Rights. 56th
Sess., Item 4, pt. III (Apr. 5, 2000) [hereinafter High Commissioner Report], available at
hnp:l/www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/viewOl/A029D87F9FD4FAFD802568B9002C
B49F?opendocument (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
86. Press Release, Council ofEurope, Statement by Assembly President on Chechnya (July 12,
200I) ("There is little doubt that the conduct of the Russian forces ... is largely to be blamed for
this.... The reports of new human rights abuses come against the background of the Russian
authorities' deplorable lack of willingness to properly investigate allegations of past abuse."), available
at http://press.coe.int/cpl2001/527a(200 I).htm.
87. See Chechnya: Implications for Russia and the Caucasus: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, l06th Congo 2 (1999) (statement of Sen. Gordon Smith, Member, Comm'n on
Foreign Relations).
The shelling of civilians and the tens of thousands of refugees who have fled
Chechnya threaten to make this current military campaign as devastating as the
Russian onslaught between 1994 and 1996. Over 100,000 Chechens were killed
during that period, and I can only hope that we will not see history repeat itself in
the current operation.
Id.
88. See Cornell, supra note 77, at 90 ("In August, aid workers operating in Chechnya
discovered evidence ofthe use ofchemical weapons. The evidence includes containers of the type used
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countless deaths due to indiscriminate bombings in civilian areas, Russian
military human rights violations in Chechnya can be classified into three
categories: (A) torture, including rape; (B) forced "disappearances;" and (C)
extrajudicial killings.
A. Torture and Rape
Torture is prohibited under Article 3 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 89 Recent
accounts of torture committed by Russian military forces and/or
mercenaries, as compiled by human rights groups, include:
• On October 10, 2001, two Chechen males, forty-nine and twenty-
two years old, were tied and beaten after soldiers raided their
village and accused them of links to Osama bin Laden. The
youngest was beaten with a hammer and had petrol poured over
him.90
• On February 2, 2000, a fifty-five year old Chechen male was
detained by soldiers and placed in a basement. The soldiers then
threw grenades into the basement twice, wounding but not killing
him. Later the man was abducted, masked, and beaten by soldiers
using rifles. He was then tied in an upraised position and beaten in
his genitals.91
• On March 5, 2000, a fifty-one year old Chechen male was arrested
by Russian special police and beaten for several hours. Police cut
off his hair and forced him to eat it, forced burning metal parts into
his mouth and nose, and carved racist words on his forehead with a
knife. He was beaten unconscious and taken horne. Four days later
soldiers again beat him and cut off his ear.92
• On June 22, 2001, a Chechen male was detained and interrogated
by soldiers who punched, kicked, and beat him with a hose and
for chemical warfare, defoliated trees, skin irritations among villagers 'consistent with the use of toxic
chemicals', and witness reports ofyellow gases.").
89. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr. 11, 1950,
art. 3, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter Convention for Human Rights] available al
http://www.echr.coe.intlConventionlwebConvenENG.pdf.
90. Memorandum from Amnesty International to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe on the Conflict in Chechnya, Russian Federation, Failure to Protect or Punish: Human Rights
Violations and Impunity in Chechnya, 7 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty Memo] (describing the
case of Magomed and Akhmed Mutaev), available al hnp:l/web.arnnesty.orgllibrary/indexl
ENGEUR460042002 (last visited Dec. 2,2003).
91. Jd. at 7-8 (describing case of Zaindi Bisultanov).
92. Jd. at 11-12 (describing case ofAlaudin Sadykov).
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metal rod. He was repeatedly questioned and beaten, shocked, and
placed in a covered pit over the course of several days.93
• On July I, 200 I two Chechen brothers were detained by soldiers
and beaten periodically over a six day period. The soldiers tied the
two brothers to chairs and forced them to watch the other receive
electric shocks, including to ears and genitals. Soldiers also forced
an object into one brother's mouth to keep it open and then filed his
teeth.94
Numerous accounts of rape have also been collected, despite a strong
cultural tendency to avoid public reporting of such experiences:
• In January 2000, two Chechen women were arrested on a bus and
taken to a military checkpoint. The soldiers accused one woman of
being a sniper, and attempted to force her to shoot a gun they gave
her. They beat and raped her after exclaiming, "you will never
have children again.,,95
• On June 26, 2001, three soldiers gang raped a Chechen woman who
was nine-months pregnant. During the rape, the woman gave birth
to her child. One soldier then stopped the other two from killing
the newly born baby.96
• On March 27, 2000, soldiers abducted an eighteen-year-old
Chechen woman from her home. Medical reports indicated that she
was beaten, raped, and then strangled to death.97 In what was the
first instance of a high ranking Russian officer being arrested and
charged with murder of a civilian in Chechnya, Colonel Yuri
Budanov was brought before a military court for her death.98 He
was found ''temporarily insane" and acquitted by the court.99
93. Human Rights Watch, Swept Under: Torture. Forced Disappearances. and Extrajudicial
Killings During Sweep Operations in Chechnya, 14 RUSSIAICHECHNYA No.2 (0), 22-23 (2002)
(describing case of "Umar Chadaev"), available at http://www.hrw.org/reportsl2002J
russchech/chech0202.pdf.
94. Id. at 28-29 (describing case of"Bisultan and Muslim Barkhaev'').
95. Memorandum from Human Rights Watch, to Members of the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 3~ (Jan. 10, 2002), available at
http://hrw.orglbackgrounder/ecalchechnya_women.pdf(last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
96. Amnesty Memo, supra note 90, at 10 (discussing the case of"Fatima").
97. Memorandum from Human Rights Watch, supra note 95, at 2-3 (describing case ofKheda
Kungaeva).
98. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, RussialChechnya: Justice Flouted in Military Murder
Case (Dec. 31, 2002) (describing the abduction and murder of Elza Kungaeva and review of Colonel
Budanov's case), available at http://www.hrw.orglpressl2002J12IrussiaI23I.htm (last visited Nov. 2,
2003).
99. Id. (asserting that Budanov's acquittal was a "travesty ofjustice").
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Soldiers commonly conduct "sweep operations" in Chechnya, where
entire villages are sealed and homes searched, with ''the stated aim of
seizing illegal weapons and ferreting out those believed to be collaborating
with Chechen rebels."loo
• On January 14, 2001, two Chechen men were entering a village
then being "swept" by Russian soldiers. They waited at the
outskirts by the road. Later, witnesses saw soldiers detaining the
men and placing them in armored personnel carriers. The next day,
police told inquiring relatives that the men were being held at the
station and would soon be released. Their dead bodies were found
days later in a rock quarry.IOI
• On August 8, 2000, two Chechen brothers were detained by
soldiers during a sweep of the village of Gekhi. The father of the
brothers saw soldiers place his youngest son, who was tied, into an
armored personnel carrier. It was later announced on Russian
television that soldiers had killed Chechen rebel commanders in
Gekhi, and then depicted the dead body ofone "commander"-who
the father realized was his youngest son. Bodies of both sons were
later found in an unmarked grave. 102
• On February 18, 2001, soldiers stopped a car and detained two
Chechen brothers, releasing a third passenger on the spot. Relatives
went to a military base to inquire into their whereabouts, but
officials denied they were detained there. Days later, an individual
approached one of the relatives and confirmed they were held at the
base and would be released for a price ofD.S. $6,000. The relative
did not have the money, and instead sent complaints to military
authorities on numerous occasions, with little acknowledgment.
The brothers had not yet surfaced, alive or dead, at the time the
relative was last interviewed by human rights workers in 2002. 103
100. Human Rights Watch. The "Dirty War" In Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture,
and Summary Executions. 13 RussIAlCHECHNYA No. I (D), at 8 (2001) [hereinafter Dirty War].
available at http://www.hrw.orglreportsl200l/chechnyaIRSCH030I.PDF (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
101. Id. at 8-9 (describing the cases ofAkhmed Z8urbekov and Kharnzad Khasarov).
102. Id. at 10-11 (describing the cases ofAli Musaev and Umar Musaev).
103. Human Rights Watch, Last Seen . ..: Continued "Disappearances" in Chechnya, 14
RUSSIA No.3 (d), at 14-15 (2002) [hereinafter Last Seen] (describing the cases of Mair-Ali Shavanov
and Lema Shavanov), available at http://hrw.orglreportsl2002/russchech02lchech0402.pdf (last visited
Nov. 2,2003).
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• On February 13, 2001, anned and masked men detained four
Chechen men and drove them to an officer's base. Relatives
arrived at the base and inquired into their whereabouts. An officer
verified that they were being questioned, and three of the men were
later released. An officer told relatives of the fourth man that he
had been transferred to another location, which he refused to
identify. Relatives had since not received information about him at
the time they were last interviewed by human rights workers. I04
C. Extrajudicial Killings
Thousands of civilians have been killed in indiscriminate bombing or
shelling by Russian forces in Chechnya. los The bombardment of Grozny
and subsequent creation of refugees, asserted Senator Christopher Smith,
"brutally reduced Grozny's former 400,000 population in half."I06 In some
instances, Russian soldiers have barred aid workers access into towns
during military operations. 107 In another instance, soldiers promised
Chechen civilians a day's refrain from shelling to fmd food, and then
opened fire with artillery after they emerged. 108 In addition to deaths
created as a result of indiscriminate military force, numerous accounts of
extrajudicial killings have also been collected by human rights
organizations.
• On October 22, 2002, Russian soldiers conducted a sweep of the
village of Chechen-Aul, and detained eight men. Two were
released after having been beaten, one "disappeared," and the
104. ld at21 (describing the case oftman Masaev).
105. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Human Rights Watch, Russia: Three
Months of War in Chechnya, 7 HUM. RTS. WATCH!HELSINKJ No.6, at 4, 7-11 (1995) (outlining
instances of"[i]ndiscriminate and [d]isproportiOll8te [u]se of [f]orce by Russian [t}roops" in a number of
Chechen villages and in Gromy shortly after the start of the war), available at
http://www.hrw.orglreports/I995/Russia1.htm(lastvisitedNov. 2, 2003).
106. Hearing on Chechnya: Hearing Before the Comm'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur.,
l04th Congo 25 (1995) (statement of Sen. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman, Comm'n on Sec. and
Cooperation in Eur.).
107. AMNESTY Im'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1997, at 269 (1997) (noting the
bombardment of the town of Semovodsk and how International Red Cross workers were not allowed
in).
108. AMNESTY Im'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2001, at 199 (2001) ("The villagers
had been promised a 'safe corridor' for one day to allow them to collect food. Despite these assurances,
the group came under artillery attack and at least three women were killed and five were wounded.").
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remaining five were found several days later in a nearby field dead,
and bearing signs of torture. 109
• On November 14, 2002, masked men wearing Russian special
forces uniforms abducted a fifty-two year old Chechen man from
his house. The man was later found executed nearby. A racist,
anti-Chechen slogan was left on the home's gate--"Greetings,
Darkies!"llo
• On December 10, 2000, three Chechen men were detained by
masked soldiers during a sweep of several villages. All three men
were later found in a mass grave outside the village of Dachny, shot
dead, blindfolded, and with their hands tied behind their backs. I II
In the same grave, some fifty other bodies were found, including at
least thirteen who have since been identified as "disappeared."
Many of them bore gunshots to the head or stomach and some were
scalped or otherwise mutilated. I12
The Russian response to allegations of human rights violations by its
forces has been less than adequate. In regards to the mass grave found in
2001 at Dachny, Russian authorities prematurely re-buried a number of the
bodies or otherwise failed to conduct adequate medical examinations for
evidence. 113 This led the international human rights monitoring
organization Human Rights Watch to declare that the investigation was,
unfortunately, "typical of Russia's general failure to carry out meaningful
investigations into widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian
law that have been perpetrated by its troops." 114 In other situations,
investigations are opened by the appropriate civilian agencies, but they lack
the jurisdiction to cover military forces, or are otherwise ineffective in
investigating claims against soldiers. I IS
109. Human Rights Watch, Into Harm's Way: Forced Return ofDisplaced People to Chechnya,
15 RUSSIA No. I (0), at 18-19 (2003) (describing events in the village ofChechen-Aul in late October
to early November 2002), available at http://hrw.org/reports!2003/russia0I03/russiaOI03.pdf (last
visited Nov. 3,2003).
110. Id at 19 (describing the case of Khosh-Ahmed Zainutdinov).
III. Human Rights Watch, Burying the Evidence: The Botched Investigation into a Mass Grave
in Chechnya, 13 RUSSIAICHECHNYA No.3 (D), at 8-9 (2001) [hereinafter Burying the Evidence]
(discussing the cases of Magomed Magomadov, Odes Mitaev, and Said-Rakhman Musaev), available al
http://www.hrw.org/reports!200I/chechnya2/chechnya2.pdf(last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
1l2. Dirty War, supra note 100, at 31-32 (describing the mass grave at Dachny village
discovered in early 200 I).
113. Burying lhe EVidence, supra note III, at 15-19 (discussing the Russian investigation of the
grave at Oachny and its shortcomings).
114. Id.atI5.
115. Dirty War, supra note 100, at 24 ("The most devastating flaw in the investigative process is
the civilian procuracy's lack of authority to compel cooperation by the military ...."). In the same
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The inadequate response by authorities may be improving, albeit
barely. For example, in the early parts of the war, the Chechen Republic's
civilian authorities forwarded 342 reports of major violations by Russian
soldiers to the military and internal affairs authorities, with "approximately
half' being closed or stalled and the rest returned to the civilian
authorities. 116 Even if civilian authorities retained the jurisdiction to
investigate crimes by soldiers or special forces, they cannot stop the transfer
of military units out of Chechnya after alleged violations occur.1I7 During
2001, of 102 investigations initiated by the Chechen Republic's official
authorities, only one case resulted in a conviction at the time with a number
of others being either suspended or still investigated. I IS Among military
authorities, Human Rights Watch noted that of 118 investigations of
Russian forces, eleven murder prosecutions were secured as of December
2001. 119
Criticism of Russia and the impunity with which its forces operate in
Chechnya from the Council of Europe,120 the United Nations,121 and human
report, Human Rights Watch asserted that civilian authorities are "poorly staffed, late in opening
investigations, and in some cases failll even to take the most basic steps, such as questioning available
witnesses." [d. at 23.
116. Human Rights Watch, Russian Federation: A Review of the Compliance of the Russian
Federation with Council of Europe Commitments and Other HUnll1n Rights Obligations on the First
Anniversary ofits Accession to the Council ofEurope, 9 HUM. RTs. WATCHIHELsINKJ No.3 (D), at 11
(1997) (discussing the forwarding of cases by the Chechen Procuracy to military officials and
subsequent treatment of cases), available at http://www.hrw.orglreportsll997/rusfedIRussia-04.htm; see
also RUDOLF BINDlG, COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AFFAIRS AND HUMAN RlGHTS, Doc. 9732: The Human
Rights Situation in the Chechen Republic, § IV, , 5-9, (Mar. 13,2003) (noting assessments of criminal
investigations for human rights abuses in Chechnya, and citing a Human Rights Watch report that
seventy-nine percent of all disappearance cases have been closed), available at
http://www.europarl.eu.intlmeetdocsldelegations/russl20030409-Tchecheniel05.pdf.
117. Last Seen, supra note 103, at 38 (asserting that civilian authorities "lack authority to
investigate abuses by military personnel ... [or] prevent the regular transfers of units of the security
forces out of Chechnya" and that at times "it was apparent that transfers ... were designed expressly to
frustrate investigations").
118. [d. at 40 (discussing the "lack of diligence" of civilian authorities in cases opened between
May and December 200I).
119. [d. (asserting that "[t]he military procuracy demonstrates a similar lack of diligence in their
investigation ofabuses involving allegations against service personnel").
120. See Press Release, Council of Europe, Assembly Gravely Concerned About Human Rights
in Chechnya, Puts the Situation Under Its Constant Review (Jan. 25, 2001) ("[The Council of Europe's
Parliamentary Assembly] pointed out that a combination of iII-disciplined troops and the apparent
failure to pursue alleged crimes committed by servicemen created a climate of impunity, leading to more
human rights violations, and demanded that it be remedied immediately."), available at
http://press.coe.intlcpI2001/57a(2001).htm (last visited Nov. 9,2003).
121. High Commissioner Report, supra note 85, at 6, pt. III ("[T]he most pressing and
immediate issue, in my view, concerns the adequacy and credibility of the response by the Russian
authorities to the scale of allegations of gross human rights violations such as mass killings, extra-
judicial, summary or arbitrary executions, violence against women, torture, arbitrary detention and
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rights groups,l22 has been profound, perhaps helping to encourage greater
accountability among its armed forces in Chechnya. Still, the overall
official Russian response to human rights violations committed by its forces
in Chechnya has been extremely poor. As Senator Christopher Smith
related in May 2002: "Occasionally, the Russian Government announces
that criminal charges have been filed against certain military personnel for
egregious human [rights] violations in Chechnya. However, the record
indicates that most of these cases eventually melt like snow in the noonday
soo.,,123
III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Court of Human Rights functions as the primary judicial
mechanism for the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,124 signed by members of the Council of Europe in
1950. The Council came into being in 1949, composed primarily of
Western European nations lH committed to "individual freedom, political
liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine
democracy.,,126 Soviet-bloc nations could not join the Council as it required
its members to "accept the principles of the rule of law and of the
enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and
pillage."); Press Release, United Nations Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Commission
'Deeply Concerned' Over Situation in Chechnya (Apr. 25, 1996) (''The Commission on Human Rights
this moming expressed its deep concern that the disproportionate use of force by .the Russian
Federation'~ armed forces in Chechnya continued to lead to the grave violation of human rights and
intemational humanitarian law."), available al ht1p://www.un.orgINewslPressldocsll9961
19960425.hrcn751.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
122. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Russia: "Sham" Grave Investigation (Apr. 17,
2001) ("[T]he Russian govanment's investigation into the mass grave site discovered in late February
near the main Russian military base in Chechnya has been absolutely inadequate. The fifty-one bodies
found show evidence of having been extrajudicially executed and bear unmistakable signs of tor1Ure."),
available at ht1p:l/www.hrw.orglpressl200IlO4lchechgrave0417.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
123. Developments in the Chechen Co'lflict: Hearing Before the Comm'n on Sec. and
Cooperation in Eur., 107th Congo 27 (2002) (statement of Sen. Christopher H. Smith, Chairman,
Comm'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur.).
124. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 19.
125. See Jonathan L. Black-Branch, Observing and Enforcing Human Rights Under lhe Council
ofEurope: The Crealion ofa Permanent European Courl ofHuman Rights, 3 BUFF. 1. INT'L L. I, 4-5
(1996) (discussing the creation of the Council of Europe and its human rights mission). The original
signatories were "the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Federal Republic of Germany, including West
Berlin, the Saar, Ireland, Greece, Denmark, Iceland, and Luxembourg." Id.
126. Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, pmbl., Europ. T.S. No. I [hereinafter
Statute]. See also Gerard Quinn, 17Je European Union and Ihe Council ofEurope on lhe Issue ofHuman
Rights: Twins Separaled al Birlh?, 46 MCGILL LJ. 849, 856-57 (2001) (discussing the conjoined
relationship of human rights with democracy as a principle of the Council of Europe and the
Convention).
2004] Chechnya's Last Chance? 259
fundamental freedoms." 127 The Council's organizing principles and
purposes revolve around the creation and facilitation of a common
"European Policy" towards primarily political and social, but also economic
matters, with the exception of defense issues.128 Thus, a recent work has
characterized the Council as having three basic purposes: "to protect and
reinforce democratic pluralism and human rights, ... seek common
solutions to the major societal problems confronting its member
states, ... [and] encourage a heightened sense of Europe's multicultural
identity.,,129 However, the Council, which has expanded to include forty-
five members as of 2003, including Russia, engages in a wide variety of
policy activities and has concluded conventions on issues ranging from
education to biomedicine to the media and the arts. I3O
Both the Court and Convention have evolved since the Council's
origins. The Convention was signed in 1950 and "entered into force on
September 3, 1953." 131 It was the first of the Council's numerous
conventions and is still regarded as its most important one.132 Many of the
Convention's rights and protections derive from the United Nations'
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR). 133 The
Convention provides for a right to life, 134 prohibition of torture, 135
127. Statute, supra note 126, art 3; see also, MANuAL OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE:
STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 137 (1970) [hereinafter MANuAL] (asserting that Article
3 ofthe Statute was "clearly intended in 1949 to exclude the communist countries ofEastern Europe and
Spain and Portugal").
128. See Statute, supra note 126, art. I(d), (stating that "[m]atters relating to national defense do
not fall within the scope of the Council ofEurope"); MANuAL, supra note 127, at 118-19 (discussing the
early development of the Council as a mechanism for discussion, creation, and promotion of general
policy issues); id. at 103 (asserting that "[t]he Council ofEurope is essentially a political organisation");
A.H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTmJ1l0NS: COOPERATION, INTEGRATION, UNIFICATION 33-34 (2nd
ed. 1966) (discussing the purpose of the Council of Europe and asserting that it is an organization
primarily focusing on international co-operation in regards to common policy issues, rather than a forum
for the creation ofa larger union).
129. Diana Pinto, 1he Council ofEurope: Its Missions and Its Structures, in THE CHALLENGES
OF AGREATER EUROPE: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY 29, 29 (1996).
130. For an overview ofCouncil of Europe activities, see THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ABoUT THE
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, available at http://www.coe.intrr/ElComlAbout_COEl (last visited Jan. 29,
2004).
131. ROBERTSON, supra note 128, at 46.
132. See Pinto, supra note 129, at 34 (asserting that the Council "derives its strength from the
more than ISS conventions it has concluded over the years, the oldest and most important of which is
the European Convention on Human Rights'').
133. See Black-Branch, supra note 125, at 5-{j (discussing the origins of the Convention and
how the UDHR "served as a model" for the Convention drafters).
134. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 2.
135. ld art. 3.
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prohibition of slavery,136 right to a fair trial,137 freedom of religion, 138
freedom of assembly,139 and other fundamental protections.
However, the Council went beyond the UDHR model and created a
means by which the strength of its provisions would exceed that enjoyed by
the United Nations. 140 This was done through the creation of three
individual bodies: (I) the European Commission of Human Rights; (2) the
Court ofHuman Rights; and (3) the Committee of Ministers.
At that time, the Commission was composed of international law jurists
from the Council's contracting party-nations, who served in a number of
capacities. First, the Commission was charged with determining the
admissibility of cases initiated by individuals against state actors.141 The
very fact that individuals could initiate claims against states before the
Commission in a supranational forum was, and still is, regarded as a
groundbreaking development in intemationallaw.142 Prior to the creation of
the Convention, the proposal for allowing individual petitions was a major
issue of contention among contracting parties.143 By allowing individual
claims to be represented by the Commission, as well as those initiated by
government actors, the Convention has become, in the words of the United
Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights, "probably the most
effective human rights enforcement mechanism in existence.,,144 However,
the Commission adhered to strict guidelines in determining whether such
136. Id. art. 4.
137. Id. art. 6.
138. Id. art. 9.
139. Id. art. II.
140. See MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 15
(2d ed. 20(0) ("[T]he Universal Declaration provided no legal machinery to enforce rules against
recalcitrant states.... [s]o it made sense, especially in Europe, for there to be regional international
human rights machinery which might provide realistic enforcement mechanisms."); Black-Branch,
supra note 125, at 5--6 ("[T]he Council of Europe was motivated to go beyond recognizing the
principles of human rights enshrined in the U.N. Declaration and set out to entrench these principles in
an international treaty which was open for nations to sign.").
141. See MANuAL, supra note 127, at 267~8 (describing the Commission's role in determining
admissibility of cases and requirements imposed on that process).
142. See ROBERTSON, supra note 128, at 48 ("It is the great merit of the European Convention
on Human Rights that it institutes a procedure which permits an individual to complain to the European
Commission even against his own government.").
143. JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 19-21 (citing discussion and disagreement among
Convention committee members in 1949 in regards to the proposal to allow individual complaints
against states).
144. Human Rights and Europe's Wron&f, EUROPAWORLD, Oct. 11, 2000 (quoting Mary
Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights), at http://www.europaworld.orglissue8/
humrigtEurwrongl0ll00.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2003).
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petitions were admissible. 145 For instance, it could only examine cases
involving claims ratione materiae-admissible on merits derived from the
Convention's stated protections,146 in which domestic remedies had already
been pursued and exhausted,147 and for those states that recognized the right
of individuals to initiate actions. 148
If the Commission found a case to be admissible, then it was charged
with a second function-that of fact finder. 149 A sub-commission or
delegation would be created, that would conduct on-site investigations or
hear witness testimony by concerned parties. ISO Upon determining the facts
of a case, the Commission could then attempt to conclude a "friendly
settlement" between the parties concerned. lSI If successful, the
Commission would publish a report on the settlement, effectively ending
the matter. IS2 If unsuccessful, the Commission would forward a complete
statement of the facts and a non-binding opinion as to the merits of the
claim to the Committee ofMinisters and the Court. 1S3
At this point, the Court or the Committee of Ministers would be
charged with reviewing the case. The Committee was responsible for
hearing cases that were not pursued in the Court by either the Commission
145. See D.J. HARRIs ET AL., LAw OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 604-24
(1995) (outlining the major barriers to admissibility, particularly those related to the requirement that
domestic remedies be exhausted before claims are reviewed by the Commission).
146. MANuAL, supra note 127, at 267.
147. See TOM ZWART, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETmONS: THE CASE LAw OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITfEE 187-230 (1994)
(describing and analyzing the domestic remedies requirement ofthe Convention).
148. See Pinto, supra note 129, at 35 (1996) (describing how contracting parties could not be
forced to accept the Convention's stipulations regarding individual petitions against them); see also
Heinrich K1ebes, Membership in International Organizations and National Constitutional Law: A Case
Study ofthe Law and Practice ofthe Council ofEurope, 1999 ST. LoUlS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC LJ.
69,71 (1999) (discussing the reluctance and voluntary acquiescence of several European nations to the
Convention's requirements over time).
149. See ROBERTSON, supra note 128, at 47-48 (outlining the role of the Commission in
"ascertaining the facts" of a case and either settling the dispute or referring it to the ECHR); see also
JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 61-63 (citing the example of the Commission's fact finding in the inter-
state claim against Greece for violations of the Convention following the 1967 military coup).
150. See MANuAL, supra note 127, at 268-69 (describing examples of the Commission's fact
finding procedures).
IS l. Id.; see also JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 46-53 (citing a 1980 case in which a "friendly
settlement" was concluded between a number of African and European nations, and noting that such
settlements, at least between inter-state actors, are somewhat rare).
152. MANuAL, supra note 127, at 269 (describing the reporting activities of the Commission
when settlements were, and were not, concluded successfully).
153. Id. (discussing the Commission's role in forwarding claims to the Committee and Court for
subsequent review).
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or a nation-member.154 Cases not referred to the Court would be sent to the
Committee, which is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
contracting parties, 155 and which is technically responsible for
implementing the decisions of the Council of Europe as its executive
body.156 However, the Committee's enforcement capabilities are limited
because the actual Ministers of Foreign Affairs do not meet often,IS7 and
because it does not enjoy any formal jurisdiction. ISS Thus, although the
Committee enjoys the ability to determine whether or not a violation of the
Convention has taken place by a two-thirds majority vote of all
"representatives entitled to sit on the Committee,,,IS9 it is mainly limited in
its responses, such as making recommendations to the governments of the
nation-members of the Council. 160 In the absence of such a vote, the
Committee may opt to do nothing. 161
Adjudication by the Committee of Ministers, in this sense, has played a
largely symbolic role, since the cases involving serious breaches of the
Convention would be pursued in the ECHR. 162· The Committee, thus,
154. JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 31 (discussing the forwarding of cases to the ECHR by
either the Commission or a state-member).
155. Statute, supra note 126, art. 14.
156. [d. art. 13 ("The Committee of Minis1ers is the organ which acts on behalfof the Council of
Europe ....").
157. See ROBERTSON,supra note 128, at 37-38 (discussing the workload for the Committee and
the necessity to delegate much of its duties to lower ranking bureaucrats that represent the various
ministers); Black-Branch, supra note 125, at 25 (noting that the actual Committee formally meets only
two times per year).
158. See MANuAL, supra note 127, at 276.
[T]here is a well-known principle of inlemational law that a State may only be
brought before an international court with its consent; and, when the Convention
was drafted, some States did not agree to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. It
was therefore decided that the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
should be empowered to take decisions on the question of violation of the
Convention.
[d.
159. Statute, supra note 126, art. 20(a). This article also requires a unanimous vote by
"representatives casting a vote." [d.
160. See id. art. 15(b) ("In appropria1e cases, the conclusions of the Committee may take the
form of recommendations to the governments of members, and the Committee may request the
governments of members to inform it of the action taken by them with regard to such
recommendations."); see also ROBERTSON, supra note 128, at 38 ("The very limited nature of the
powers of the Committee is immediately apparent. They are wide in scope but narrow in
effect. ... [T]he result of the deliberations is only to make a recommendation to Member Governments
and not to take a decision that will be binding on them.").
161. See JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 29 ("If no such majority [is] forthcoming, the
Committee of Ministers simply deciders] to take no action.").
162. See id. (discussing how the Committee hears only those cases that are not forwarded to the
Court). The Committee does, however, playa key role in other aspects of the Council of Europe's
activities beyond adjudicative matters involving alleged violations of the Convention for Human Rights,
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usually "has no difficulty in endorsing the conclusions in the Commission's
report. Undoubtedly this is made easier by the fact that most of the cases
will either concern uncontroversial issues that have already been
examined" 163 or cases in which the respondent government would be
willing to adhere to the Committee's recommendations. l64 Thus, decisions
of the Committee of Ministers are usually adhered to by member-
governments of the Council ofEurope.16S
The third, and most important, mechanism of the Convention is the
ECHR. The Court is vested with jurisdiction over all matters concerning
the "interpretation and application" of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. l66 The ECHR serves as
Europe's constitutional court for human rights.167 This Court was originally
limited in its powers because member-nations of the Council were not
obligated to accept the jurisdiction of the Court unless they consented to
it. 168 Those who could bring cases to the Court were the Commission of
Human Rights, a member-state that was acting on behalf of one of its
nationals alleging a violation of the Convention, a respondent member-
state, or any member-state to the Convention. 169 Individuals themselves
could not bring cases directly to the Court, but could initiate cases by
petitioning the Commission to represent its claims. l7o
most notably, through its adoption ofconventions in other policy areas. See Pinto, supra note 129, at 31
(explaining the various roles of the Committee, including initiating the adoption of legally binding
conventions).
163. HARRIs ET AL., supra note 145, at 694.
164. [d. at 693 (asserting that many of the cases that are forwarded to the Committee of
Ministers are those in which "the Commission has found a violation but either the case raises issues
which are already the subject of established Court case-law or the govenunent has intimated that it
accepts the Commission's finding and is willing to take the necessary consequential measures").
165. See MANuAL, supra note 127, at 276 (noting that nations generally "malee a point of
conforming to a decision by the Committee of Ministers").
166. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 32.
167. HARRIs ET AL., supra note 145, at 648; JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 64-65; Klebes,
supra note 148, at 77 ("[T]he European Court of Human Rights now plays the role of a European
'constitutional court' for all matters relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, just as the
Court of Justice of the European Communities is a 'constitutional court' for matters falling in the
domain ofcommunity law.'').
168. MANuAL, supra note 127, at 278 (noting how the Court, at the time that the Manual was
published, couid not hear cases in which the member-states of the Council of Europe had not yet
voluntarily accepted its jurisdiction).
169. Black-Branch, supra note 125, at 24 (outlining the parties that could bring cases to the
Court under the former Article 48 of the Convention).
170. HARRIs ET AL., supra note 145, at 659-60 (discussing the early position that individuals
had no right to bring a case to the Court or to be a party); JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 66-67 (noting
how although individuals could not originally bring cases to the Court, the Court recognized that the
Commission could represent the interests of the individual in its very first case).
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Most of the cases referred to the Court were through the Commission
for Human Rights. 171 Governments forwarded a number of cases to the
Court via interstate petition through the Commission. A few times,
however, interstate petitions were brought by member-nations that seemed
to have little direct interest in the alleged violation, other than a desire to
remedy a perceived violation by another member-nation. 172 Other
restrictions on admissibility beyond the jurisdictional consent obstacle and
the limitations imposed in regards to standing, were that the "Court [could]
only examine a case after the Commission [] acknowledged the failure to
reach a friendly settlement agreement and within a [three-month period]
following the transmission of the Commission's report to the Committee of
Ministers.,,173
The Court is composed of international law jurists representing each of
the member-nations of the Council of Europe, 174 forty-five as of 2003. The
Council's Assembly elects judges to the Court/7S which then elects its own
President, Vice-Presidents, and other administrators.176 Depending on the
gravity of the case, the Court hears cases in panels of three, seven, or
seventeen judges.177 The President, in consultation with the parties and the
Commission, will dictate a timeline for written and oral proceedings and
filings of necessary documents.178 During oral proceedings, representatives
from the contesting parties, a delegate from the Commission, and various
witnesses are heard. 179 Proceedings are typically conducted in either of the
two official languages ofthe Council: English or French.18o
During proceedings, the Court may be able to fashion a friendly
settlement between the parties, which often involves an agreement to pay
compensation and/or promise to change the national law or policy
implicated. 181 If the case is not removed from the Court, it will deliberate in
171. See JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 66-67 (discussing standing to bring cases to the Court
up to 1994 and noting that the majority of cases were referred to the Court by the Commission).
172. See DoNNA GoMIEN ET AL., LAw AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTtON ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 4a--41 (1996) (discussing two such interstate
claims by the Scandinavian nations, the Netherlands, and France, against first Greece, and later,
Turkey).
173. HARRIs ET AL., supra note 145, at 652 (noting the three-month requirement and inability to
mediate a settlement before a case could be referred to the Court).
174. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 20 ("The Court shall consist ofa number
ofjudges equal to that of the High Contracting Parties.").
175. Id. art. 22.
176. Id. art. 26.
177. Id. art. 27.
178. GoMIEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 77.
179. Id. at 78.
180. HARRIS ET AL.,supra note 145, at 658.
181. Id. at 680-&1.
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private following the conclusion of oral proceedings and issue a public
decision as to whether a violation has occurred. 182 The Court retains a
powerful means by which to authorize its decisions. If a violation of the
Convention is found, and "if the internal law of the High Contracting Party
concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.,,183 However, ''just
satisfaction" is limited strictly to the payment of monetary compensation,l84
and awarded only if the offending member-nation has not adequately
offered to voluntarily remedy the situation through a change in its domestic
practices and/or payment of compensation to the victim or victims.18s If the
offending state has failed to adequately address the situation, then two
forms of compensation can be directed: (1) expenses related to legal fees
and other administrative costs; and (2) "damages"~ither"pecuniary" or
"moral." 186 The pecuniary damages will typically cover compensatory
needs to make injured parties "whole again," whereas moral damages serve
to reward them for the loss and grievances resulting from the violation.187
Member-nations that are party to the Convention are obligated to follow the
Court's judgment, which is technically to be executed by the Committee of
Ministers.188 As the body officially composed of the foreign ministers of
the Council's member-nations, the Committee greatly influences nations'
compliance with the Court's judgments. The degree to which member-
nations have complied with the Court "is generally recognised to be
exemplary."189 Nations have, in almost every case, followed the Court's
182. GoMIEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 82 (describing the issuance of decisions, which typically
contain a statement of the facts, summaries of the party's positions, and an opinion as to the merits of
the case and whether a violation has occurred).
183. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 41; see also, id. art. 13, at 10 ("Everyone
whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority ...."). For discussion on what constitutes an "effective remedy," see
FRANCIS G. JACOBS & ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 338-39
(2nd ed. 1996).
184. GoMIEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 82 (noting that the Court does not retain the power to
force a member-nation to change its laws or policies).
185. HARRIs ET AL., supra note 145, at 684-85 (noting how the Court will not rely on its "just
satisfaction" imperative unless a member-nation has failed to appropriately redress the situation and
offer compensation on its own).
186. ld. at 686-87.
187. ld.
188. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 46 ("The High Contracting Parties
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. The final
judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its
execution.").
189. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 145, at 702.
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rulings. 190 This includes payment of monetary damages to victims of
Convention violations.191 . In rare cases, the influence of the Court and the
Council in general has led to some nations being virtually removed as a
party to the Convention, as Greece voluntarily left following its 1967 right-
wing military COUp.192
In 1994, the Convention's organs were substantially revised to reflect a
rapidly growing caseload, concurrent with the expansion of the Council's
membership, through Protocol Number 11 of the Convention. 193 This may
have been a reflection of its credibility and enforcement capabilities:
The European Convention on Human Rights ... has for
several years been a victim of its own success. Applicants have
to wait for an average of five years ... after making their
application to the European Commission of Human Rights before
the European Court of Human Rights gives its final decision.
This situation has become unacceptable.
. . . [T]he number of applications is rising, not only from
the emerging democracies of central and eastern Europe, but also
from the "old" member states. In 1995[,] 3480 applications were
registered by the Commission compared to the 1985 figure of
596; the Court issued eighty-seven judgments in 1995, against
eleven in 1985.194
To streamline the adjudication of alleged Convention violations, Protocol
Number 11 eliminated the Commission of Human Rights and vested its
190. See Klebes, supra note 148, at 78 (referring to a survey ofclose to forty years ofjudgments
by the Court and asserting that "[a]1I its decisions have been respected, though sometimes grudgingly,
by the States concerned").
191. JANIS ET AL.,supra note 140, at 69.
192. GoMIEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 89 (discussing Greece's alleged violations of the
Convention and its subsequent departure from the Council of Europe); see Pinto, supra note 129, at 30
(outlining instances in which relations between the Council and Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, were
broken or substantially damaged due to a failure to maintain appropriate levels of democratic
governance).
193. Protocol No. II to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, Nov. S, 1994, pmbl., Europ. T.S.
No. 155 [hereinafter Protocol No. II ] (outlining a recognized need, in reference to the Convention, to
"maintain and improve the efficiency of its protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
mainly in view of the increase in the number ofapplications and the growing membership of the Council
of Europe").
194. A New Court ofHuman Rights in Strasbourg. in THE CHALLENGES OF AGREATER EUROPE:
THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY 81, 81 (1996) [hereinafter A New Court]; see
a/so, JANIS ET AL., supra note 140, at 70 '("While there were only ten judgments delivered by the
European Court in the 19605, there were 26 judgments in the 19705, 169 in the 19805, and, in the first
nine years of the 19905, already 818, an annual average about 30 times that of the [International Court of
Justice].").
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admissibility and review functions to a single entity, the ECHR. 195 It also
formally allowed individuals, groups of individuals, and non-governmental
organizations, in addition to member-states, the right to petition the Court
directly for alleged violations. 196 Furthermore, whereas member-states
originally had the option of not consenting to petitions derived from
individuals' allegations, Protocol Number 11 required that all parties to the
Convention-i.e., all members of the Council-accept the jurisdiction of
the Court when it comes to claims initiated by any party-states or
individuals. 197 Committees and Chambers composed of judges of the
Court, then, are responsible for determining the admissibility of c1aimsl98
subject to provisions ,overning admissibility criteria that have largely
remained unchanged. 1 The revamped Court also assumed the ability
previously granted to the Commission to conduct friendly settlements
between disputing parties.20o
The European Convention, the EClIR. and its associated machinery in
the Council, remain effective and powerful organs for the protection of
'human rights in Europe. All nations seeking to join the Council of Europe
must become parties to the Convention and accept its jurisdiction, including
over those actions initiated by individuals following the passage of Protocol
Number 11. This serves to continuously encourage member-nations'
compliance with the provisions laid out in the Convention.201 Its greatest
contributions to the international human rights movement are its elevation
of individual rights beyond the sole jurisdiction of domestic regimes into
195. Protocol No. 11, supra note 193, art. I (establishing a permanent Court of Human Rights to
"ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the
Convention").
196. ld. art. 34 ("The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto.").
197. See id. (stating that in regards to individual and NGO applications, "[t)he High Contracting
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right").
198. A New Court, supra note 194, at 82-83 (describing the review of applications by the Court
post-Protocol No. 11); see also GoMIEN ET AL., supra note 172, at 91-92 (explaining how individual
applications will be ruled on by a committee, whereas interstate applications are decided by a Chamber).
199. See Protocol No. II, supra note 193, art. 35 (outlining criteria for admissibility, including
that domestic remedies be exhausted, claims be asserted within six months after exhausting domestic
remedies, individual applications not be anonymous or reflect matters previously examined by the Court
or by another concurrent adjudication mechanism, and that claims derive from the content jurisdiction of
the Convention).
200. ld. art. 38 (I)(b) (noting the Court's abilities to conclude friendly settlements between
parties).
201. See Pinto, supra note 129, at 36 ("[E)ast European countries now joining or aspiring to join
the Council of Europe are expected, as an entrance requirement, to accede to the European Convention
on Human Rights in its entirety.... The requirements for admission to the Council of Europe are thus
constantly being raised ....").
268 Vermont Law Review [Vol. 28:237
international law, and a sufficiently strong ability to remedy Convention
violations?02 Either through friendly settlements or judgments, member-
nations have changed domestic regulations or legislation, or amended
constitutions, to remain in compliance with the Convention.203 Currently,
the Convention stands as "the essential Bill of Rights for 800 million
people."204
IV. CHECHNYA'S CASE IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The International "Response"
International response to the war in Chechnya and the allegations of
massive abuses of human rights by Russian forces has been varied, but
generally lacking in any substantial effects. 205 Despite whatever moral
condemnation Russia has received for the actions of its military, the
international community still formally treats the conflict as an internal
Russian affair, as opposed to an international war.206 Although popular or
202. HARRIs ET AL., supra note 145, at 28-29.
For the first time, sovereign states accepted legally binding obligations to secure
the classical human rights for all persons within their jurisdiction and to allow all
individuals, including their nationals, to bring claims against them leading to a
binding judgment by an international court finding them in breach. This was a
revolutionary step in a law of nations that had been based for centuries on such
deeply entrenched foundations as the idea that the treatment of nationals was
within the domestic jurisdiction of states and that individuals were not the subject
of rights in international law.... [T)he Convention remains the most advanced
instrument of this kind.
Id; see also LVAL S. SUNGA, INDIVlDUALRESPONSIBILlTV IN INTERNATIONAL LAw FOR SERIOUS
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 139-49 (1992) (outlining some traditional conceptualizations of
individuals within the international law framework and noting that the Nuremberg trials were important
for recognizing individual culpability for human rights violations in international law).
203. MANuAL, supra note 127, at 282 (outlining instances in Norway, Belgium and Austria, in
which member-nations took actions to comply with the Convention); Georg Ress, The European
Convention on Human Rights and States Parties: The Legal Effect of the Judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights on the [nternal Law and Before Domestic Courts of the Contracting States. in
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: LIMITS AND EFFECTS 209, 256 (Irene Maier ed., 1982)
(describing an instance when the Federal Republic ofGermany amended its Code ofCriminal Procedure
and Code of the Constitution of Courts in order to comply with the Convention in a pre-emptive
manner).
204. Human Rights and Europe's Wron&s, EUROPAWORLD, Oct. II, 2000, at
hnp://www.europaworld.orglissue8lhumrigtEurwrongI01100.htm (last visited Nov. 4,2003).
205. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text (listing examples of criticism by various
parties towards Russia in regards to the human rights situation in Chechnya).
206. See Bellocchi, supra note 66, at 190-91 (arguing that Chechnya has a legitimate claim for
independence, and criticizing the international community for not recognizing its independence); Peter
Daniel DiPaola, Note, A Noble Sacrifice? Jus Ad Bellum and the International Community's Gamble in
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radical segments of the Islamic world have perhaps embraced Chechnya's
independence, formal support by governments of Islamic nations has been
lacking. 207 The United States, although proffering some criticism. has
largely conceded the matter to be an internal Russian affair since the
beginning of the crisis in 1994.208 United States' support for Russia and its
increasing willingness to tum a blind eye to human rights violations in
Chechnya has become more common since the Russian Federation became
a pragmatic partner of the United States and its war against international
terrorism.209
Chechnya, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 435, 465--69 (1997) (discussing possible explanations why
the international community has neglected to directly address the conflict between Russia and
Chechnya); Hollis, supra note 66, at 793-94 (asserting that "[dlespite expressing moral outrage at acts
such as Russia's indiscriminate bombing of civilians, foreign governments tempered their criticism by
recalling that Chechnya remained a part of the Russian Federation").
207. Cornell, supra note 77, at 92-93 (noting muted reaction by the governments of Turkey and
Iran towards Chechnya); Iran Describes Chechnya Issue as Internal Russian Affair, DEUTSCHE PRESSE·
AGENTUR, Feb. 16, 2003 (reporting an Iranian diplomat's statement that the conflict in Chechnya was an
internal Russian affair, and attributing Iran's stance to a desire to maintain positive ties with Russia),
available at LEXIS, News Library, World News File (last visited Nov. 3, 2003); see also Shireen
Hunter, Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy, 56 J. INT'L AFF. 133, 133-47 (2003) (discussing Iran's
national interests and the importance of maintaining secure relations with Russia). But see Thomas D.
Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, IS AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 869,869-70
(2000) (noting the Taliban's recognition ofChechnya as an independent state).
208. See Michael R. Gordon, u.s. Stays AloofFrom Russia's War Within, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1994, §4, at 10 (describing President Clinton's stance towards the situation in Chechnya in late 1994).
209. See Masha Lipman, On Chechnya, Bush Is Putin's Enabler, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.),
Nov. 26,2002, at AI3.
President Bush has likened the Ocl 23 seizure of hostages in a Moscow theater to
the Sept. II, 200I, attacks in the United States. He couldn't have come up with a
better present for his good friend Vladimir before their meeting in St. Petersburg
last week. President Vladimir Putin, of course, will not admit that the terrorist
attack was in any way related to the ferocious and bloody war the Russian army
has waged on Chechnya for the past three years.
Id; see also Vladimir Mikheyev, How to Bring Peace to Grozny, RusDATA DIALINE-RuSSIAN PRESS
DIGEST, Sept. 28, 2001, at I (reporting a Russian newspaper's assertion that the United States' post·
September II, 200I, stance towards Chechnya "amounts to recognition of the validity of the Kremlin's
course in constantly stressing to the Western powers the direct link between the Chechen mafia-type
extremism and the terrorist international"), available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region,
Europe, News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
Commentators have criticized the Russian strategy of continually referring to the situation in
Chechnya as an operation against terrorism. KNEZYS & SEDLICKAS, supra note 2, at 176.
[TIhe "military terrorism" conducted by the Russians differed only in its
scale.... What is more, the international community remained in much the same
stupor. But as soon as a similar act, only on a much smaller scale, was executed
on Russian soil in response, immediately cry was made about ''terrorism.''
Id.
For its part, the Russian exaggeration of the political role of religion in prewar
Chechnya was an effort to brand the Chechen separatists as 'Muslim
fundamentalists.' The intention ... has generally been threefold: to appeal to
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Criticism of Russia has been stronger in Europe, however. Former
Soviet-bloc states in Eastern Europe have been most vocal in support for
Chechen independence.2IO Both the European Union2ll and the Council of
Europe212 have also expressed strong criticism of Russia. Members of the
Western audiences with the line that the war has been a sort of Western crusade
against a common Islamic enemy; to argue that the Chechens are too 'primitive'
to have developed a modem nationalism and sense of national identity; and to
suggest that as simple, primitive people, they have been misled by religious
propaganda into acting contrary to their own best interests.
LIEVEN, supra note 14, at 357. Some U.S. legislators have been equally critical of the Russian casting
of the Chechen War as an operation against terrorism. As Senator Christopher H. Smith asserted:
Moscow contends that the war in Chechnya is an integral part of the war
against international terrorism, although President Putin himself has noted the
"historical roots" to the conflict, as opposed to the presence of foreign terrorist
elements. It must be noted that the U.S. Government has confirmed links between
some insurgents in Chechnya and ''various terrorist organizations and
mujahidin." ... At the same time, we have called for accountability for human
rights violations on all sides ....
Let me be clear. I understand completely the concern of the Russian
Government, or any government, for the security of its borders, its domestic
tranquility, and its territorial integrity. But, this does not give the Russian military
a blank check to kill or torture any young man capable of fighting or other
citizens young and old, or to rape and steal, or to bomb hospitals and
humanitarian convoys.
Developments in the Chechen Cor!flict, Hearing Before the Comm 'n on Sec. and Cooperation in Eur.,
107th Congo 26-27 (2002) (statement ofSen. Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman, Cornm'n on Sec. and
Cooperation in Eur.).
210. Cornell, supra note 77, at 93-94 (outlining support for Chechen independence in Eastern
European nations, particularly the former Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania); Group in
Estonian Parliament Calls on U.S., Russian Leaders to Recognize Chechen Independence, BALTIC
NEWS SERV., Apr. 22, 1997 (reporting on support for Chechnya's independence among ministers in
Estonia's parliament), available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News,
European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). Perhaps the only commonality shared between
the Baltic nations and the Taliban of Afghanistan was their support for Chechnya's independence and
historical experience under Soviet authorities. Afghanistan formally recognized Chechnya's
independence in early 2000. Grant, supra note 207, at 869-70.
211. See Russian War Crimes in Chechnya Must Be Prosecuted: EU Parliament, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, July 3, 2003 (noting an EU resolution calling for the investigation and prosecution of
human rights violations in Chechnya by Russian forces). available at LEXIS, News & Business,
Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 3, 2003); EU
Condemns Russia for Chechnya Onslaught, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 10, 1999 (noting EU
condemnation of Russia's bombing ofGrozny and Russia's ultimatum that all civilians leave the city or
face annihilation), available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European
News Sources File (last visited Nov. 10,2003).
212. Press Release, Council of Europe, Assembly Urges Russia to Act Without Delay on
Chechnya (Sept. 28, 2000) ("The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly today reiterated its
conviction that Russia's conduct of its military campaign in the Chechen Republic and the resulting
human rights violations are unacceptable in terms of the Council of Europe's principles and
objectives."), available at http://press.coe.intlcp/2000/654a(2000).htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003); Press
Release, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly President Calls for Immediate Investigation of
Reports ofSummary Executions in Chechnya (Feb. II, 2000), available at http://press.coe.int/
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Council itself have directly advocated that Russia be subject to the
provisions of the Convention and asserted that the Council should "pursue
all avenues of accountability with regard to the Russian
Federation ... including interstate complaints before the ECHR and the
exercise of universal jurisdiction for the most serious crimes committed in
the Chechen Republic.,,213 Beyond vocal condemnation, however, little has
been done by the international community to effectively prevent Russian
forces from continuing to commit alleged war crimes in Chechnya and offer
redress for Chechen victims of human rights abuses.
For the first time, however, an opportunity for judicial accountability-
not just moral criticism-has manifested for Chechen victims of alleged
Russian military human rights violations. On January 16, 2003, it was
announced that the ECHR ruled admissible for the first time, claims against
Russia by Chechen residents for violations of the Human Rights
Convention during the war in 1999-2000.214
The six applications deemed admissible by the Court in January 2003
are related to three separate events, although they largely allege violations
of the same Convention articles. Khashiyev v. Russia and Akayeva v.
Russia charge Russia with the disappearances, torture, and deaths of several
Chechen residents following the Russian military's occupation of a suburb
of Grozny in January 2000.215 Isayeva v. Russia, Yusupova v. Russia and
Bazayeva v. Russia charge Russia with deaths, injuries, and property
damage resulting from a Russian aerial bombardment of civilians leaving
cp/2000/110a(2000).htm (last visited March 6, 2004).
We have received alanning reports from usually reliable sources on the execution
ofat least 38 civilians, on violence, looting and destruction of civilian property by
Russian troops. Not only must these reports be investigated, the perpetrators must
be brought to justice and the Russian authorities must take action to prevent such
acts being committed.
Jd. (quoting the Assembly president Lord Russell-Johnston). For further support, see Press Release,
Council of Europe, Assembly Urges Russia to Find Peaceful Solution in Chechnya (Jan. 27, 2000)
("With its military operation in Chechnya, Russia is violating some of its most important obligations
under the European human rights convention and international humanitarian law ...."), available al
http://press.coe.intlcpl2000/68a(2000).htm (last visited Nov. 4,2003).
213. BINDIG, supra note 116, § lV, , 68.
214. Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Six Complaints Against Russia
Concerning Events in Chechnya Declared Admissible (Jan. 16, 2003), available al
http://www.echr.coe.intlEng/Pressl2003/janlDecisiononadmissibility6Chechenapplicationseng.htm (last
visited Nov. 4, 2003).
215. Khashiyev v. Russia, App. No. 57942/00, Eur. Ct H.R. at 12 (2002) [hereinafter Khashiyev
& A/cayeva Admissibility] (decision as to admissibility) (consolidated with Alcayeva v. Russia, App. No.
57945100), QVailable al http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2lHEDECI200301l57942_02_da_
chbl_19_12_02.doc (last visited Nov. 10,2003).
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Grozny in October 1999.216 Isayeva v. Russia charges Russia with deaths
relating from aerial bombardment of civilians leaving the town of Katyr-
Yurt in February 2000.217
The remainder of this Article will examine recent ECHR case law on
violations of Article 2 (protection of the right to life), Article 3 (prohibition
of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment), and Article 13 (right to an
effective domestic remedy) of the Convention in relation to Khashiyev and
Akayeva. Significant ECHR precedent already exists regarding disappeared
persons cases, much of which, but not all, involves complaints filed by
Kurds against the government of Turkey.218 This Article will conclude with
thoughts on how the Court should rule on Convention violations, in light of
established Court precedent on disappearances and ill-treatment. Particular
focus will be on violations of Article 2 and Article 13, relating to patterns of
disappearances and alleged killings in Chechnya, as illustrated by the
charges in Khashiyev and Akayeva.
B. Khashiyev and Akayeva
The Court originally joined the separate cases of Khashiyev and
Akayeva in July 2000, as each involved similar circumstances derived from
the entrance of Russian military forces into Gromy in the beginning of
2000.219
Russia's initial air campaign of its "second war" in Chechnya began on
September 5, 1999, followed by a ground invasion directed towards
capturing Gromy.220 The Russian military soon encircled the ciry221 and in
216. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57947/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 10-11 (2002) (decision as to
admissibility) (consolidated with Yusupova v. Russia, App. No. 57948/00, and Bazayeva v. Russia, App.
No. 57949/00) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2lHEDEC/
200301I57947_00_57948_00_57949_00_da_chb1_19_12_02.doc (last visited Nov. 10,2003).
217. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, Eur. Ct H.R. at 2, 8 (2002) (decision as to
admissibility), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intIHudoc2doc2/HEDECI200301/57950_02_da__chbl_
19_12_02.uoc (last visited Nov. 10,2003).
218. For a general background and perspective on the situation of Kurds in Turkey, see HENRI J.
BARKEY & GRAHAM E. FULLER, TuRKEY'S KURDISH QUESTION 5-60, 133-55 (1998); JAMES CIMENT,
THE KURDS: STATE AND MINORITY IN TuRKEY, IRAQ AND IRAN 43-52, 187-89 (1996); MICHAEL M.
GuNTER, THE KURDS AND THE fUTuRE OF TuRKEY 79-84 (1997); CHRISTOPHER HOUSTON, ISLAM,
KURDS AND THE TuRKISH NATION STATE 95-111 (2001); Olivia Q. Goldman, The Need for an
Independent International Mechanism to Protect Group Rights: A Case Study ofthe Kurds, 2 TuLSA J.
COMPo & INT'L L. 45, 67-75 (1994); Edip Yuksel, Yes, I Am a Kurd, 7 J.INT'L L. & PRAC. 359 (1998).
219. See Khashiyev & Akayeva Admissibility, supra note 215, at I (stating date of applications
and the Court's decision to join applications on July 11,2000).
220. See Marina Koreneva, Russian Troops Break into Chechnya as Grozny Threatens Deadly
Reprisals, AGENCE FRANCE PREsSE, Sept. 30, 1999 (describing a Russian announcement that its troops
were entering Chechnya), available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News,
European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4, 2003); Russian Troops in Chechenia, Europeans
2004] Chechnya's Last Chance? 273
December had issued an ultimatum stating that "[p]ersons who stay in the
city will be considered terrorists and bandits and will be destroyed by
artillery and aviation.... Everyone who does not leave the city will be
destroyed." 222 Throughout December and into January 2000, Russian
ground forces entered the city, taking heavy losses, 223 and finally
announced that they had secured Grozny on February 6,2000.224
During January 2000, reports began surfacing about grave human
rights violations directed at Chechen civilians by Russian forces throughout
the republic during the height of the battle for Grozny.22S Both Khashiyev
and Akayeva were residents of Grozny who had managed to escape the
"Concerned," DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Sept. 30, 1999 (discussing escalation of the Russian
invasion of Chechnya and expectations of a full-scale ground attack), available at LEXIS, News &
Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4, 2003);
Ten Chechens Killed in Latest Russian Air Assault, AGENCE fRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 29, 1999 (noting the
beginning of Russian air assaults in Chechnya following the Chechen incursion into Dagestan),
available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File
(last visited Nov. 4, 2003). For a general overview of the military tactics employed by the Russian
forces and their 1999 entrance into GrOl1lY, see OLGA OUKER, RUSSIA's CHECHEN WARS 1994-2000:
LESSONS FROM URBAN COMBAT 41-49 (200I).
221. Chechen Capital 80 Per Cent Encircled, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), Oct. 28, 1999 (reporting
the announcement by Russian troops that most of Grol1ly had been surrounded). available at LEXIS,
News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4,
2003); Russian Army to Tighten Stranglehold on Grozny, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 27, 1999
(describing Russian encirclement ofGrol1ly and bombardment of the city), available at LEXIS, News &
Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
222. Yuri Bagrov, Russian Warns Grozny Residents. Flee or Be Destroyed, AsSOC. PRESS, Dec.
6, 1999 (quoting leaflets dropped on Grol1ly stating the Russian ultimatum to an estimated 15,00~
40,000 residents left in the city), available at LEXlS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe,
News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4, 2003); see also Yuri Bagrov, Russia Claims to
Open Corridor for Civilians but Keeps Bombing Grozny, Assoc. PRESs, Dec. 7, 1999 (discussing the
Russian ultimatum to leave Gromy and intemational reaction), available at LEXlS, News & Business,
Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4,2003).
223. Yuri Bagrov, Street Fighting Rages in Grozny. Russians Halted in Several Areas, Assoc.
PRESs, Jan. 20, 2000 (describing street to street fighting in Grol1ly between Chechens and Russians),
available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File
(last visited Nov. 4, 2003); Ruslan Musayev, Russian Forces Suffer Heavy Lasses in Tank Attack on
Grozrry, Assoc. PRESS, Dec. 16, 1999 (reporting on Russian casualty figures following the first ground
assault into Gromy), available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News,
European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4, 2003); Dmitry Surtsev, Russia Unleashes Fierce Blitz
on Grozny. Southern Rebel Bases, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 16,2000 (noting conflicting reports on
Russian casualties in Chechnya), available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe,
News, European News Sources File (last visited Nov. 4,2003).
224. Lyoma Turpalov, Russia Proclaims End to Grueling Battlefor Grozny, Assoc. PRESS, Feb.
6, 2000, available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News
Sources File (last visited Nov. 4,2003).
225. See Fred Weir, Refugees Target of Russian Ire, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2000
(discussing a Russian policy to treat all arms-bearing age Chechen males as suspected terrorists and
accounts of disappearances), available at LEXlS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News,
European News Sources File.
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main brunt of the fighting and returned to Grozny in the end of January.226
According to the applicants, their witnesses, and as reported by the
international organization Human Rights Watch, the following events
allegedly occurred:
On January 19, 2000, a fifty-nine year old woman living in the
Staropromyslovski district of Grozny was injured by shrapnel.227 Two of
Khashiyev's male relatives, Khamid and Risvan, and a third man, placed
the woman in a wheelbarrow and attempted to seek medical assistance for
her.228 According to a witness who had talked to the wounded woman's
daughter, they were soon stopped by Russian soldiers, who shot the woman,
beat the three men, and then took them away?29 The next day, a soldier
confronted some other Chechen men, threatened to kill them, and then
claimed he had earlier shot and killed a wounded woman in a
wheelbarrow. 230 That same day, the woman's daughter confronted a
Russian commander who said, "[w]e are taking revenge for our dead
comrades whose mothers also wanted to see them alive.,,231 Later that day,
she found her mother's body still in the wheelbarrow, with shrapnel wounds
and a gunshot to the head.232
On January 25, 2000, Khashiyev returned to his house in the
Staropromyslovski district and found the bodies of his sister, her son, and
Akayeva's brother dead in Akayeva's yard.233 The bodies were mutilated
with multiple bullet and stab wounds and their identification documents
were lying next to the bodies.234 Later, the bodies of Khamid, Risvan, and
the third man who had accompanied them in the attempt to find assistance
for the wounded woman, were found dead in a garage with similar
wounds.23S Photos and an autopsy showing bullet wounds in the bodies of
Khamid and Risvan were taken in the nearby Republic of Ingushetia, where
many Chechen refugees had fled.236
In the coming weeks, both applicants conducted interviews with human
rights organizations and filed complaints with Russian military and civil
226. KJuuhiyev & Alcayeva Admissibility, supra note 21 S, at 2.
227. Human Rights Watch, Civilian Killings in Staropromyslovski District of Grozny, 12
RussIAlCHECHNYA No.2 (D) (2000) [hereinafter Civilian Killings), available at hnp:/Iwww.hIW.orgl








235. KJuuhiyev & Alcayeva Admissibility, supra note 21 S, at 3.
236. Id. at 4.
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authorities. 237 At the time the admissibility decision of Khashiyev and
Akayeva was announced by the ECHR, the applicants had received
contradictory information from authorities about the status of their
• •• 238lDvestlgatlons.
The Russian government objected to the facts as provided by
Khashiyev, Akayeva, and Human Rights Watch. Although the Russian
government acknowledges the deaths of both applicants' relatives, it has
stated that responsibility for their deaths could be due to Chechen terrorists
dressed as Russian soldiers, or robbers.239
V. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRECEDENT
In a number of cases, the European Court of Human Rights has issued
rulings that pertain to human rights violations and circumstances that apply
to practices of abuse occurring in Chechnya. This part outlines a series of
major themes that the Court has developed in recent case law related to
Convention violations committed by various member states. These themes
should also have significant importance to the Chechen victims' claims
brought against Russia.
A. McCann & Kaya: Article 2 Obligation to Investigate
An important obligation arising from ECHR case law is that nation-
members to the Convention must provide effective investigations of
fatalities involving the use of force by government actors. This obligation
was clearly identified in McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, a case
originating in 1988, which involved the killings of several Irish Republican
Army (IRA) operatives in Gibraltar.240 In McCann, the applicants charged
the United Kingdom with violations of Article 2 of the Convention-the
right to life.241 British intelligence tracked the movement of McCann and
237. [d. at 3-4.
238. See id. at 4-5. Russian authorities announced the opening of a criminal investigation by
Gromy prosecutors in May 2000. The case was suspended and re-opened three times by the prosecutor,
and no servicemen have been identified as possible suspects. The applicants themselves had not even
been informed of the opening of the case. [d. at 5.
239. [d. at 6.
240. McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984191, A324 Eur. Ct. H.R. W 141,
200,212-14 (1995) (holding that the United Kingdom did not violate Article 2 for its use oflethal force
against three IRA operatives but that it had breached Article 2 for exercising "a lack ofappropriate care
in the control and organization of the arrest operation"), available at hnp:/lhudoc.echr.coe.intl
Hudoc2docIHEJUDlsift/528.txt (last visited Nov. 13,2003).
241. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 2.
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two other IRA members to Gibraltar, where they were allegedly planning a
bomb detonation near a British military ceremony. 242 Convinced that a
parked car bomb had been set to detonate,243 British soldiers followed the
three suspects down streets with the intent to arrest, but instead shot and
killed all three members in the belief that they had weapons on them and/or
were immediately about to detonate a bomb.244 Following the shootings, no
weapons were found on their bodies and no bomb in the suspected car.245
About a month after the killings, a television documentary was aired
suggesting that the soldiers had killed the three IRA members in an
extrajudicial fashion.246
The applicants' main contention was that the shootings of the IRA
members constituted a violation of Article 2, paragraph 2 because they were
not "absolutely necessary" to safeguard the lives of others and instead
amounted to a pre-planned execution.247 Ultimately, the Court found that
I. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a
court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of
this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than
absolutely necessary:
a. in defence ofany person from unlawful violence;
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of
a person lawfully detained;
c. in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or
insurrection.
Id.
242. McCann, App. No. 18984191, A234 Eur. Ct. H.R W13, 15,23 (describing the surveillance
of Daniel McCann, Sean Savage, and Mairead Farrell, an IRA "Active Service Unit," which had entered
Gibraltar to allegedly detonate a bomb).
243. Id. W48, 63 (describing a British witness' account of an examination of a parked Renault
that was believed to be a car bomb set by the IRA members).
244. Id." 60-63 (describing British accounts of the shootings of McCann and Farrell); id. W
78-79 (describing British accounts of the shooting ofSavage).
245. Id.' 93 ("After the shooting, the bodies of the three suspects and Farrell's handbag were
searched. No weapons or detonating devices were discovered."); id. , 96 ("The bomb-disposal team
opened the suspect white Renault car but found no explosive device or bomb. The area was declared
safe between 19.00 and 20.00 hours.").
246. ld.' 125.
On 28 April 1988 Thames Television broadcast its documentary entitled "Death
on the Rock" ... including allegations that McCann and Farrell had been shot
while on the ground. A statement by an anonymous witness was read out to the
effect that Savage had been shot by a man who had his foot on his chest.
Id. The accepted findings of fact by the Commission of Human Rights, however, later declared that
there was no indication that the three had been shot while lying on the ground. Id. , 132.
247. Id. W 144, 174 (describing submissions to the ECHR by the United Kingdom and the
applicants).
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the shootings did not violate Article 2 because the British soldiers were
operating under a sincere belief that the three suspects were an immediate
danger based on previous intelligence reports.248 Thus, the Court found that
the United Kingdom was not directly in violation of Article 2 in the sense
that they had wrongfully killed the deceased. However, the applicants also
argued that Article 2, paragraph I imposed a general duty on governments
to provide an effective and impartial investigation into killings by state
actors?49 They argued that the official investigation failed to meet such a
standard due to inappropriate evidence-collecting procedures, inadequate
provision of legal representation, and bias. 250 Although the Court also
found that there was no violation of Article 2 under this argument/51 it did
recognize that such an obligation exists:
The Court confines itself to noting, like the Commission,
that a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents
of the State would be ineffective, in practice, if there existed no
procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of lethal force
by State authorities. The obligation to protect the right to
life ... requires by implication that there should be some form of
effective official investigation when individuals have been killed
as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the
State.252
This obligation resides in a reading of both Article 2, paragraph I and
Article I of the Convention, which states generally that: "The High
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms ... of this Convention." 253 Read together, both
Articles I and 2 thus require a proper and adequate official investigation
into deaths resulting from the use of force by government actors as a
necessary component of member-states' obligation to secure individual
rights contained in the Convention.
248. [d. flJ 18(}-81, 200 (observing that there was no evidence ofa pre-meditated execution, and
it was reasonable for the soldiers to believe that there was a bomb set to detonate based on intelligence
reports of the three IRA members).
249. [d. flJ 157, 161 (stating the applicants' charge that "the State must provide an effective ex
post facto procedure for establishing the facts surrounding a killing by agents of the State through an
independent judicial process").
250. [d.' 157.
25 I. [d. flJ 163~ (concluding that "the Court does not consider that the alleged various
shortcomings ... substantially hampered the carrying oul of a thorough, impartial and careful
examination of the circumstances surrounding the killings'').
252. [d.' 161.
253. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. I.
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This obligation was again reiterated in Kaya v. Turkey, involving the
alleged extrajudicial killing of a civilian by Turkish soldiers in 1993.254 In
Kaya, the applicant charged Turkey with a violation of Article 2's right to
life. The facts were highly disputed by both parties. The applicant alleged
that his brother, Abdiilmenaf, was traveling with another man not far from
his home village in an area where Turkish troops were conducting military
operations against Kurdish rebels. 255 After encountering soldiers,
Abdtilmenaf ran off and hid in some bushes, where, according to the
applicant's witnesses, he was subsequently found and shot by soldiers, who
then planted a weapon at his side.256 The Turkish government asserted that
its soldiers were called to the scene after receiving information about
nearby terrorist activity.257 The soldiers then came under fire, returned fire,
and subsequently found Abdiilmenaf's dead body with an assualt rifle in the
vicinity of where the shots had come from. 258 A government doctor was
then flown to the scene, where he conducted an "on-the-spot" autopsy of
the body and issued a report on the same day.259 The weapon was kept as
evidence,260 and the body was taken by the Turkish soldiers to a nearby
village for burial.261
The applicant charged Turkey with the willful, extrajudicial,
unwarranted killing of his brother, in violation of Article 2 of the
Convention.262 Due to the substantial discrepancies in the parties' versions
of the facts and the unavailability of conclusive testimony, the Court held
that it was not possible to fmd that the government had, "beyond reasonable
doubt," executed Abdiiulmenaf in an extrajudicial fashion.263 However, the
applicant also charged Turkey with a McCann-like claim that there was an
inappropriate official investigation into the death of his brother.264 The "on-
254. Kaya v. Turkey, App. No. 22n9193, 1998-1 Eur. Ct. H.R. '\I 10 (1998), available at
hnp:l/hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2/HEJUD/19981 O/kayao/020batj.doc (last visited Nov. 10,2003).
255. [d. ~9-1O.
256. [d. ~ 10 (describing the killing of AbdUlmenaf by soldiers as allegedly witnessed by
villagers).
257. [d. '1112 (describing the respondent's version ofevents).
258. [d.
259. [d. '1126-29.
260. [d. 'II 30.
261. [d. '\114.
262. [d. ~ 63 ("The applicant contended that there existed sufficiently strong, clear and
concordant inferences and unrebutted presumptions of fact which inexorably led to the conclusion that
his brother was intentionally killed by the security forces in circumstances where there was no threat to
their lives.").
263. [d. '\I 78 ("[T]he Court considers that there is an insufficient factual and evidentiary basis on
which to conclude that the applicant's brother was, beyond reasonable doubt, intentionally killed by the
security forces in the circumstances alleged by the applicant.").
264. Jd. '1179.
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the-scene" autopsy and investigation had not included a recording of crucial
information about the bullet wounds, examination of the assault weapon
allegedly fired by Abdulmenaf, or a complete review of statements by
witnesses.265 Also, the quick burial had precluded further examination of
the body.266 The Court acknowledged that the entire incident took place in
"an area prone to terrorist violence, which may have made it extremely
difficult to comply with standard practices,,,267 and that "loss of life is a
tragic and frequent occurrence in view of the security situation in south-east
Turkey.,,268 However, the Court concluded:
[N]either the prevalence of violent armed clashes nor the
high incidence of fatalities can displace the obligation under
Article 2 to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is
conducted into deaths arising out of clashes involving the
security forces, more so in cases such as the present where the
circumstances are in many respects unclear.
. . . There has accordingly been a violation of Article 2 of
th C .. h 269e onventlon m t at respect.
Kaya confirmed that the Article 2 obligation to provide an official, effective
investigation of a killing in which the government used lethal force applies
not only to isolated killings in largely civilian areas, but to deaths occurring
in areas where frequent military engagements and violence persist.
B. Tomasi & Ribitsch: Article 3 Obligation to Safeguard the Health of
Those in Custody
A series of ECHR cases also recognizes an obligation to safeguard the
health of those taken into Government custody. Tomasi v. France is
indicative of this obligation's development. Tomasi involved the detention
and torture of a French citizen by government authorities for an alleged
connection with Corsican separatists. 270 While in detention for several
days, Tomasi alleged that French guards had repeatedly beaten him, refused
265. [d." 79-83 (outlining the applicant's and respondent's arguments in regards to the alleged





270. Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, A241-A Eur. Ct. H.R." 7-8, 52 (1992) (describing
the arrest of Felix Tomasi for allegedly being a member of the Corsican Nalional Liberation Front,
which had been involved in a series of recent bombings), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
Hudoc2docIHEJUD/sift/38I.txt (last visited Nov. 11,2003).
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him food, held a gun to his head, and threatened his and his family's lives,
among other things. 271 These facts were disputed. Some witnesses in
custody with Tomasi testified to seeing him with various physical marks
that could have been the result of beatings.272 However, French authorities
completely denied the charges and medical evidence could not expressly
support all of Tomasi's allegations.273
Upon his eventual release from detention, Tomasi sued France
charging it with violating Article 3 of the Convention, which states: "No
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.,,274 In response, France argued that the inconsistent medical
evidence made it impossible to definitively presume a causal link between
Tomasi's injuries and his detention. 275 The Court, however, recognized
that: (I) there was sufficient medical evidence to indicate Tomasi was
beaten during the time of his custody/76 and (2) the custody placed him in a
vulnerable position in which French authorities were responsible for him.277
The Court concluded that Tomasi's treatment in detention was sufficiently
"inhuman and degrading" to warrant a violation of Article 3.278
The case of Ribitsch v. Austria further developed the Tomasi holding.
Ribitsch involved the detention and interrogation by Austrian police of
alleged heroin dealer Ribitsch following the high-profile overdose death of
a well-known musician.279 Facts were again disputed by the parties. While
being held in police custody and interrogated for several days, Ribitsch
claimed that he had been repeatedly beaten by officers who were under
pressure to extract a confession from him.280 Immediately following his
detention, he told several family members he had been beaten and went to a
271. [d. , 52 (citing statements by Tomasi before a judge during proceedings about his
detainment).
272. [d. '1\ 60 (noting a domestic judge's interview of a witness who had allegedly seen Tomasi
with marks on his stomach and an impaired ear); id. , 65 (noting witness accounts that Tomasi was seen
with bruises throughout his body).
273. [d. '1\ 66 (citing a domestic court's conclusions thai medical evidence was not specific
enough to corroborate Tomasi's claims and that French police had completely denied the allegations).
274. [d. 'IJ 73; Convention for Hwnan Rights, supra note 89, art. 3.
275. Tomasi, App. No. 12850/87, A241-A Eur. Ct. H.R. '11109.
276. [d. 'IJ 110 ("[The examining physicians'] certificates contain precise and concurring medical
observations and indicate dates for the occurrence of the injuries which correspond to the period spent in
custody on police premises.").
277. [d. 'IJ 113 ("The Commission stressed the vulnerability of a person held in police
custody ... [Tomasi was) deprived of his liberty and therefore in a state of inferiority.").
278. [d. '11115-16.
279. Ribitsch v. Austria, App. No. 18896/91, A336 Eur. Ct. H.R. 'IJ'IJ 7-10 (1995) (outlining
Austrian authorities' arrest of Ribitsch and his wife for drug trafficking), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2docJHEJUD/sift/549.txt(lastvisitedNov.ll, 2003).
280. [d. 'IJ 16.
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hospital that verified the existence of bruises on his ann and "symptoms
characteristic of a cervical syndrome." 281 The police involved in the
interrogation denied participating in or witnessing any maltreatment of
Ribitsch. 282 Instead, the officer charged with responsibility for most of
Ribitsch's alleged beatings claimed that Ribitsch had sustained his injuries
by accidentally slipping while getting out of a police car. 283 Forensic
evidence was inconclusive to support either Ribitsch's, or the accused
police officer's, account of events,284 and the domestic court ultimately
acquitted the alleged offending officer.28S
Before the ECHR, Ribitsch charged Austria with violating Article 3 of
the Convention.286 Similar to the French authorities' response in Tomasi,
the Austrian government maintained that although Ribitsch sustained
injuries while in custody, the inconsistency in the factual accounts did not
definitively show that the government was responsible for his injuries.287
The Commission for Human Rights stated, "[i]n the event of injuries being
sustained during police custody, it was for the Government to produce
evidence establishing facts which cast doubt on the account of events given·
by the victim.,,288 The Court found that, although the accused officer was
acquitted of any wrongdoing by the domestic court, Austria had still not
fulfilled its obligations under the European Convention. 289 Like the
Commission, the Court held that Austria was "under an obligation to
provide a plausible explanation of how the applicant's injuries were
caused,,,290 failed to fulfill that obligation,291 and consequently violated
281. Id. "liB.
282. Id. "illS.
283. Id. "1112. The officer contended that
[a]s he was getting out of the police car, and while he had handcuffs on his wrists,
Mr. Ribitsch had slipped and his right arm had banged into the rear door. [The
police officer] who had opened the door for him, managed to grab hold of his left
arm, but was not able to prevent him from falling.
Id.
284. Id. "11'\119-20 (citing a statement by an examiner from the University of Vienna's Institute of
Forensic Medicine concluding that the evidence was not specific enough to support Ribitseh's
allegations, yet at the same time did not support Officer Markl's version ofevents).
285. Jd '\122.
286. Id. '\I 24 (outlining the initial claim by Ribitsch against Austria that he had experienced
inhuman and degrading treatment while being detained).
287. Id. '30 (noting the government's arguments as to the charge of violating Article 3).
288. Id '31.
289. Id '\I 34 ("Police Officer Mark!'s acquittal in the criminal proceedings by a court bound by
the principle of presumption of innocence does not absolve Austria from its responsibility under the
Convention.").
290. Id.
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Article 3.292 Thus, Ribitsch took Tomasi a step further by recognizing a
respondent government's obligation to either rebut facts alleging inhuman
or degrading treatment while in custody, or be found in violation of
Article 3.293
C. Akdivar & KiliF Exhausting Domestic Remedies and
Provision ofan Effective Remedy
In other human rights claims against Turkey, arising from its conflict
with Kurdish separatists, the Court addressed Turkey's obligation to
provide effective judicial procedures for aggrieved victims in an
environment of instability caused by ongoing military engagement. In such
situations, the Court recognizes a state's obligation to make effective
judicial remedies available for alleged victims of government wrongdoing.
In the case of Akdivar v. Turkey, the applicants charged Turkey with a
variety of Convention violations, alleging that soldiers engaged in anti-
Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK) operations in Southeast Turkey burned
their houses and forcibly moved them out of their village in November
1992. 294 In its finding of facts, the Commission of Human Rights
concluded that "no proper investigation [of the applicants' claims] was
carried out at the domestic level.,,295 This conclusion was reached because:
(1) authorities had generally not been helpful to the applicants;296 (2) there
were indications that witness statements were created by the police;297 (3)
291. Id. ("[T]he Court concludes that the Government have [sic] not satisfactorily established
that the applicant's injuries were caused otherwise than-entirely, mainly, or partly-by the treatment
he underwent while in police custody.").
292. Id m36-40.
293. See Selmouni v. France, App. No. 25803/94, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 87, at 27 (1999),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlhudoc2doc2IHEJUD/200I09/selmouni%20-%20batj.doc (last
visited Nov. 13,2003). Here, the Court cited Tomasi and Ribitsch for the proposition
that where an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to
be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible
explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises
under Article 3 ofthe Convention.
Id
294. Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R.1I1I 13-15 (1996) (describing
the violent situation in Southeast Turkey and the allegations that government forces had burned homes
and evacuated the applicants' village), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/HudocidocIHEJUD/sift/650.txt(last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
295. Id. 11 19.
296. See id. 11 20 ("(N]o one gave proper advice to them ... on how to obtain compensation for
the loss of their homes .... (N]o authority took up the applicants' problems or referred them to the
competent body.").
297. Id. 11 23 (citing the Commission's report that "it is striking that the various statements by
the villagers are drafted in a stereotyped form and have on the whole the same contents .... [T]he
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the government's official investigation of the 1992 incident was dated two
years after the date of the alleged incident;298 and (4) the investigation was
based on a one-day helicopter fly-over of the remnants of the village.299
The Commission also concluded from its review of evidence that Turkish
soldiers were responsible for the burning of the applicants' homes.3OO
Despite these shortcomings, Turkey argued that the applicants' case
should be removed from the Court for failure to exhaust domestic remedies,
a requirement for admissibility then stated in Article 26 of the
Convention.30\ The applicants responded with the assertion that the forced
displacement of villagers by the government in Southeast Turkey was a de
facto state policy, and by implication, any judicial challenge to that policy
would be ineffective.302 The Commission also noted that it would be very
difficult in practical terms for aggrieved parties in the applicants' position
to effectively utilize judicial mechanisms if they did exist, and that even so,
Turkish authorities showed a "clear reluctance" to investigate claims
against their own forces.303
In its analysis, the Court first noted the overall importance of Article 13
of the Convention,304 that "[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set
forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by
recorded statements give the impression of having been drafted in a uniform manner by the gendarmes
rather than reflecting spontaneous declarations by the villagers").
298. [d' 22 (describing the government's investigation of the incident).
299. [d. ("It was further noted that the investigation reports of September 1994 were based on an
exploratory mission undertaken by helicopter on 2\ September 1994. During this mission, the
investigating team did not land at Kelek"i but only observed the village during low-level flights.").
300. [d." 25-27.
30I. [d.' 56. The requirement that domestic remedies be exhausted is not found at Article 26,
but in Article 35 of the Convention-Admissibility criteria: "The Court may only deal with the matter
after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of
international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was
taken." Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 35.
302. Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93, 1996-IV Eur. Ct. H.R."I 60.
[T)he destruction of their homes was part of a State-inspired policy which had
affected over two million people and almost three thousand settlements.... That
policy, in their submission, was tolerated, condoned and possibly ordered by the
highest authorities in the State and aimed at massive population displacement in
the emergency region of South-East Turkey. There was thus an administrative
practice which rendered any remedies illusory, inadequate and ineffective. Since
there were no signs that the Govemment were [sic] willing to take steps to put an
end to the practice, victims could have no effective remedy.
[d.
303. [d. ~ 63 (outlining the delegate of the Commission's position on successfully accessing
judicial proceedings given the circumstances of the case and the situation in Southeast Turkey).
304. [d. , 65 (emphasizing how the principle of exhausting domestic remedies rests on the
assumption outlined in Article 13 that an effective domestic remedy is available to aggrieved parties).
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persons acting in an official capacity.,,30S Applicants should not be forced
to exhaust domestic remedies that are not effective; thus, the admissibility
requirement is "inapplicable where an administrative practice consisting of
a repetition of acts incompatible with the Convention and official tolerance
by the State authorities has been shown to exist, and is of such a nature as to
make proceedings futile.,,306
The Court, citing previous cases as well as a decision by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, then laid out a test establishing the
burden of proof between contesting parties in regards to the exhaustion of
the domestic-remedies requirement. First, the respondent government must
establish that its domestic remedies for aggrieved parties are both effective
and available "in theory and in practice.,,301 Second, if this is proven, the
applicant must show either: (A) that domestic remedies were exhausted but
for some reason were inadequate; 308 or (B) that there are "special
circumstances absolving [the applicant] from the requirement." 309 In
making its decision, the Court recognized that at the time of the alleged
incident, the region was engulfed in violence between the PKK and
government,310 and that such a situation made it difficult to gather evidence
and effectively pursue judicial remedies.3I1 But, recognizing the Turkish
authorities' late and inadequate official investigation, the Court found that
the government had failed to rebut a presumption that its available remedies
were ineffective, and thus, there was no need for the applicants to exhaust
such remedies since it would have amounted to a futile exercise.312
In the case of Kilir; v. Turkey, the Court expounded on charges
involving Article 13 violations in relation to Article 2 right to life
305. Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 13.
306. Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93, 1996-IV Eur. Q. H.R.' 67.
307. Id '68.
308. Id. ("[O]nce this burden of proof has been satisfied it falls to the applicant to establish that
the remedy advanced by the Government was in fact exhausted or was for some reason inadequate and
ineffective in the particular circumstances of the case ....").
309. Id
310. Id, 70 ("[T]he situation existing in South-East Turkey at the time of the applicants'
complaints was-and continues t(f be-characterised by significant civil strife due to the campaign of
terrorist violence waged by the PKK and the counter-insurgency measures taken by the Government in
response to it").
311. Id. ("In particular, the difficulties in securing probative evidence for the purposes of
domestic legal proceedings, inherent in such a troubled situation, may make the pursuit of judicial
remedies futile ....").
312. Id, 75 ("[I]n the absence ofconvincing explanations from the Government in rebuttal, the
applicants have demonstrated the existence of special circumstances which dispensed them at the time of
the events complained of from the obligation to exhaust this remedy.").
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charges.313 In that case, Kemal Kili~, a human rights activist and journalist
who had worked for a pro-Kurdish newspaper, had been tracked, shot, and
killed by unknown assailants.314 His death occurred after he made several
requests to local government officials for protection. 315 A government
investigation did take place, but was lacking due to inadequate evidentiary
proceedings and a failure to explore the possibility that Kili~ had been
murdered by Government-supported agents. 316 The applicant, Kemal's
brother, charged Turkey with both an Article 2 violation for failing to
investigate his death, as we)) as an Article 13 violation for failing to provide
an effective domestic remedy. 317
The Court found that Turkey had violated both Article 2318 and Article
13.319 In doing so, the Court rejected Turkey's argument that it could do
little to safeguard the security of all persons in Southeast Turkey due to the
ongoing military conflict between the government and the PKK.320 Because
inadequate protections "permitted or fostered a lack of accountability of
members of the security forces for their actions,,,321 Turkey had an Article 2
obligation to "take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within
its jurisdiction."322 Beyond any Article 2 obligations to preventively secure
Kemal Kili~'s right to life, the failure to appropriately investigate his death
violated Article 13 's guarantee of a right to an effective remedy-a right
that the Court stated as being even broader than the requirements of Article
313. Kili~ v. Turkey, App. No. 22492/93, 2000-lD Eur. Ct. H.R (2000), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2IHEJUD/lOO207/kilic.batj.doc (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
314. [d." 9, 14-15 (describing circumstances surrounding Kemal KiIi~'s death on February 18,
1993).
315. [d. ~ I0-13 (outlining Kemal KiIi~'s public complaints about threats and attacks made to
himself and other associates).
316. [d. W 79-82 (outlining the official investigation in Kili~'s death and instances of its
inadequacies).
317. [d.~' 54, 88.
318. [d. ~ 83.
Having regard therefore to the limited scope and short duration of the
investigation in this case, the Court finds that the authorities have failed to carry
out an effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding Kemal Kili~'s
death. It concludes that there has in this respect been a violation of Article 2 of
the Convention.
[d.
319. [d.' 93 (holding that an Article 13 violation had taken place due to the lack ofan effective
investigation).
320. [d.' 60 (outlining Turkey's argument that "security forces did their utmost to establish law
and order" and "in the climate ofwidespread intimidation and violence, no one in society could have felt
safe at that time").
321. [d., 75.
322. [d. ~ 62.
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2.323 Akdivar and Kilir; together impose an obligation on member-nations to
both safeguard the individual right to life, as well as provide aggrieved
parties with an effective remedy following the commission of violations,
even in environments characterized by military confrontation that may
impair judicial proceedings.
D. Kurt, <;akici, Timurta~, & <;il(ek: Custody and Extrajudicial Killings
The Court's treatment of "disappearances" is also illustrated in cases
involving abusive Turkish government practices related to its conflict with
Kurdish separatists.324 Violations of Convention protections often revolve
around critical factual questions regarding the establishment of custody of
those alleged to have been victims of extrajudicial killings.
In the case of Kurt v. Turkey, the applicant charged the government
with multiple violations of the Convention after last seeing her son
surrounded by government soldiers following a raid of their village in
Novemper 1993.325 After inquiring into his whereabouts several days later,
authorities asserted that they had no record of his detention, and that they
believed her son had been kidnapped by the PKK.326
In her case before the Court, the applicant asserted that Turkey violated
its Article 2 obligation, even though no body had ever been found.327 The
fact that her son was last seen in the presence of government soldiers,
coupled with the ongoing and documented practice of torture and killings in
Southeast Turkey, compelled the logical conclusion that he had been
detained and died in government custody, thus violating Turkey's Article 2
323. Id., 93 ("[N]o effective criminal investigation can be considered to have been conducted
in accordance with Article 13, the requirements of which are broader than the obligation to investigate
imposed by Article 2.»).
324. See generally Gobind Singh Sethi, The Ewopean Court of Human Rights' Jurisprudence
on Issues of Forced Disappearances, 8 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 29 (2001). In this Article, Sethi provides a
concise analysis of the development of the Court's cases involving Turkey and its operations against the
Kurds, specifically as illustrated in the cases of Kurt v. Turkey, Timurta~ v. Turkey, and <;i~k v. Turkey.
Id. at 30-32. See also Irum Taqi, Note, At:(judiCXlting Disappearance Cases in Turkey: An Argumentfor
Adopting the Inter-American Court of Human Rights' Approach, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 940, 984-87
(2001). Taqi analyzes Kurt, <;akici and Timur~ and concludes that the contradicting tests employed by
the Court in disappearance cases should be remedied by adoption of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights' approach of relying on context that presumes recurring patterns of disappearances by
governments. Id Sethi also arrives at a similar conclusion. See Sethi, supra, at 31. See also infra notes
384-89 and accompanying text (discussing the appropriateness of the European Court adopting an
analysis that takes into account circumstantial evidence and overall context in the determination of
disappearance cases).
325. Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276194, 1998-III Eur. Ct. H.R. mI 14-15, 72 (1998), available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc2IHEJUD/I9990I/Kurt%20batj.doc (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
326. Id. ~~ 16-17. .
327. Id.' 101.
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obligations.328 Citing both McCann and Kaya,329 the Court stated that an
Article 2 requirement to investigate an alleged killing of an individual by
government agents is implicated after a body is produced.330 There was no
concrete evidence that Kurt had ever been detained by the government at a
threshold beyond a reasonable doubt.331 Because there was only a general
presumption that he may have been detained and then killed by government
forces, neither an Article 2 right to life, nor Article 3 prohibition of torture
violation could be proven.332 However, since Kurt may have been detained
and either tortured or killed by authorities, and government officials had
inadequately investigated this possibility after the applicant approached the
public prosecutor,333 the Court found that Turkey violated Article 13.334
The principles of Kurt, however, were later unraveled by the Court in
another disappearance case--<;akici v. Turkey.33S In (:akici, the applicant
argued that police detained Ahmet <;akici in a village raid in November
1993 and subsequently took him to several police stations were he was held
in custody and tortured. 336 The government responded that <;akici had
never been taken into custody by authorities and there were no records of
his detention.337 Instead, the government asserted that he was aligned with
PKK fighters the entire time the applicant alleged he was detained, and was
later killed in an armed confrontation between government forces and the
PKK in early 1995.338 Government police simply released information
claiming that a body had been found with <;akici's identity card following
the clash, but did not release records as to any further examination or burial
32S. Id. m! 101-{)2 (outlining the applicant's arguments that Turkey was in violation of Article
2, despite the lack of concrete evidence that he had been detained by authorities beyond having been last
seen in the presence of soldiers).
329. See supra Part V.A (discussing these cases).
330. Kurt, App. No. 24276/94, I99S·III Eur. Ct H.R. 'V 107 (noting that the Court must establish
under Article 2 whether the victim was detained by the respondent state, and that such a burden must be
established beyond a reasonable doubt).
331. Id. mI 107-{)S. For a discussion on the beyond a reasonable doubt threshold in ECHR
disappearance cases, see Sethi, supra note 324, at 30-31.
332. Kurt, App. No. 24276/94, 1995-III Eur. Ct H.R. '1M! lOS, 116 (stating in regards to the
alleged Article 2 violation, that "the applicant's case rests entirely on presumptions ... [thatl are not in
themselves sufficient to compensate for the absence of more persuasive indications that her son did in
fact meet his death in custody" and noting that the same reasons also justify a rejection of her Article 3
charge).
333. Id. 'V 141.
334. Id. 'V 142 (holding that no effective remedy had been available to the applicant).
335. Cakici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999), available at
hnp:/lhudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2IHEJUDI200105/cakici%20%20batjo/02()'o/02023657jv.
gc%200S079ge.doc (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
336. Id. 'V'V 15-16, at 4-5.
337. Id. 'V 19, at 5.
338. Id. 'V 20, at 5.
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of the body. 339 Relying on statements from a variety of witnesses, the
Commission, operating in its function as fact-finder, concluded that <;akici
had indeed been arrested by authorities in the village raid, contrary to the
government's claims, and that he had spent at least some time in
government detention where he had been mistreated.340
The Court accepted these facts, and ruled that Turkey violated <;akici's
Article 2 right to life because there was enough circumstantial evidence,
particularly Turkey'S claim that his identity card was later found on a dead
PKK. fighter.34 \ The Court found that Turkey had violated Article 2 on two
levels: (I) <;akici's death was "attributable to the respondent State,,342 in the
sense that it assessed responsibility for his death on Turkey; and (2) Turkey
also failed to provide a McCann or Kaya type Article 2 investigation into
his death.343 The latter holding was particularly significant because, unlike
in McCann or Kaya, <;akici's dead body was never produced, and his death
by government agents was largely inferred through deduction and
circumstantial evidence.
In reviewing the applicant's Article 3 charge that the government had
tortured <;akici in detention, the Court noted that "in cases of
unacknowledged detention and disappearance independent, objective
medical evidence or eyewitness testimony was unlikely to be forthcoming
and that to require either as a prerequisite of a fmding of a violation of
Article 3 would undermine the protection afforded by that provision."344
Relying again on witness testimony, the Court found that the authorities had
violated Article 3's prohibition oftorture as well.34s 9akici, thus, diverged
from Kurt and indicated that in the absence of official custody records,346 or
even the body of the alleged victim, Article 2 and Article 3 violations can
be inferred from witness testimony and circumstantial evidence. The Court
339. Id. ~ 52, at 13.
340. Id. ~ 48-50, at 12-13.
341. Id."I 85, at 22 ("[V]ery strong inferences may be drawn from the authorities' claim that
[C;;akici's] identity card was found on the body of a dead terrorist. The Court finds on this basis that
there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, based on concrete elements, on which it may be concluded
beyond reasonable doubt that Abmet C;;akici died following his apprehension and detention by the
security forces.").
342. Id. '\I 87, at 22-23 ("As Abmet C;;akici must be presumed dead following an
unacknowledged detention by the security forces, the Court finds that the responsibility of the
respondent State for his death is engaged.").
343. See id. '\I 86-87, at 22-23 (stating that the lack of an adequate investigation also amounted
to a failure of the state's Article 2 obligations).
344. Id. ~ 91, at 23.
345. Id. ~~ 91-92, at 23-24 ("[T]his evidence supports a finding to the required standard of
proof, i.e. beyond reasonable doubt, that Ahmet C;;akici was tortured during his detention.").
346. See id. ~ 85, at 22 (accepting as fact that C;;akici had been held in detention by the
government even though there were no custody records to indicate the detention).
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found Turkey in violation of Article 13 as well, for failing to provide an
effective remedy to the applicant following <;akici's "unacknowledged
detention" and presumption of death.347
In TimurtQ.$ v. Turkey, the applicant alleged that his son, Abdulvahap,
was taken by soldiers around August 1993 and held in detention for an
unknown period of time, where he presumably died.348 Turkey alleged that
Abdulvahap had not been detained and that he had simply left home.349
However, the applicant produced a photocopied police document indicating
that police detained Abdulvahap in August 1993, and taken together with
corroborating witness statements, the Commission concluded that his
detention did occur. 350 Relying on 9akici, the Court noted that the
determination of whether an Article 2 violation had occurred depends on
"all the circumstances of the case, and in particular on the existence of
sufficient circumstantial evidence, based on concrete elements.,,351 Three
significant factors352 in Abdulvahap's case were: (1) the Court accepted as
fact that he had been detained by the police;353 (2) a long period of time had
elapsed since his disappearance, which supported a presumption of death;354
and (3) the general situation in Southeast Turkey in 1993 also supported a
presumption of death after disappearance, including, as also noted in Kilit;,
the government's inability to protect the lives of individuals in the area and
lack of accountability for the actions of its forces due to "defects
347. Id." 113-14, at 30.
348. Timu~ v. Turkey, App. No. 23531194, 200o-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. " 15-18, at 3-4 (2000),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2IHEJUDI200207/timurtas.batj.doc (last visited Dec. 2,
2003).
349. Id. '122, at 5.
350. Id. W28,42,45, at 6, II, 12 (noting the Commission's conclusion that Abdulvahap had
been detained on August 14, 1993, and subsequently held in detention at two locations).
351. Id. 'I 82, at 22.
352. Sethi identifies an additional significant factor contributing to a presumption that detention
had occurred: that there was evidence explaining why the government would be motivated to detain the
alleged victim. Sethi, supra note 324, at 30.
353. Timurt~, App. No. 23531/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. ~ 85, at 22 (distinguishing Abdulvahap's case
from the facts in Kurt-in which there wasn't enough evidence to conclude that Kurt had been taken
into detention by authorities).
354. See id. ~ 83, at 22 ("It must be accepted that the more time goes by without any news of the
detained person, the greater the likelihood that he or she has died."); id. ~ 85, at 22 ("[S]ix and a half
years have now elapsed since Abdulvahap Timu~ was apprehended and detained-a period markedly
longer than the four and a half years between the taking into detention of the applicant's son and the
Court's judgment in the Kurt case."). It was not stated why a period of six and a half years was
sufficiently significant to presume the occurrence of a death whereas a period of four and a half years
was supposedly not as significant.
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undermining the effectiveness of criminal law protection."m As in <;akici,
the Court concluded that Turkey violated Article 2 both for its role in
Abdulvahap's death,356 and for later failing to investigate the applicant's
case. 357 Furthermore, the applicant had an "arguable complaint" for an
alleged violation of the Convention, and Article 13 requires a domestic
remedy in response to such a complaint.358 The Court held that Turkey had
failed to provide such a remedy to the applicant's complaint and therefore
violated Article 13 as well.359
The Court's analyses in <;akici and TimurtCl$-finding that a
disappearance and death could be inferred from overall circumstantial
evidence-was also recognized in <;i~ek v. Turkey. 360 In <;i~ek, the
applicant alleged that the government took her sons into custody following
a raid on their village by approximately one hundred soldiers. 361 The
government claimed that no military operation had occurred in the village
on the date the sons were allegedly taken, and that the sons had not been
detained by the government, but had possibly left the country for Syria.362
There were conflicting statements by witnesses regarding the alleged
military operation in the village and the sons' supposed detention.363 No
custody records were found indicating that the sons had been detained in
government facilities.364
Faced with discrepancies between the statements of the applicant's
witnesses and the government's witnesses, and in the absence of any
custody records showing that the sons had been detained, the Court
concluded that the military operation had occurred and the sons had been
355. Id. , 85, at 23 (citing Kilif, noting the "general context of the situation in south-east
Turkey" and recognizing that "defects undermining the effectiveness of criminal law
protection ... permitted or fostered a lack of accountability of members of the security forces").
356. [d.' 86, at 23.
357. [d. ~ 89-90, at 23-24 (outlining instances of "lethargy" characterizing the investigation of
Abdulvahap's disappearance, and holding that the inadequate official investigation of the case also
amounted to an Article 2 violation).
358. [d. , III, at 29 (citing (:akici and noting that Article 13 requires an effective domestic
remedy in response to the substance ofarguable complaints).
359. [d. 11 112-13, at 29 (stating that there was "no doubt that the applicant had an arguable
complaint" and that Turkey had failed to provide the appropriate remedy for it).
360. C;;i~k v. Turkey, App. No. 25704194, Eur. Cl. H.R. (2001), available at
hnp://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2docOIo5Chedec%5Csift''105C2580.txt (last visited Mar. 6, 2004).
361. [d. mJ 1(}-17, at 3 (outlining the applicant's version of facts regarding her two sons'
disappearances on May 10, 1994).
362. [d. ft 19-21, at 4 (outlining the respondent's version of facts and denying that any
detention took place).
363. Id. '/'1127-31, at 5-6 (describing the statements of various witnesses taken by police and the
public prosecutor).
364. [d.' 24, at 5 (noting that records at government holding facilities did not show the names
of the applicant's sons).
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detained based on the consistencies of the applicant's witnesses. 365 In
regards to the lack of custody records at the government facilities where the
sons were allegedly taken, the Court stated that "even if the applicant's
sons' names do not appear in the custody registers, this does not prove that
they were not arrested by the gendarmes.,,366 Similar to the analysis in
TimurtQ§, the Court held that (1) consistent witness testimonies established
that the sons had in fact been detained;367 (2) the significant passage of time
since the sons' disappearance supported a presumption of death;368 and (3)
the general situation in Southeast Turkey fostered a lack of accountability
among government forces.369 Therefore, Turkey again violated Article 2's
right to life for its role in the sons' deaths370 and failure to investigate the
case.371 In addition, Turkey violated Article 13 due to the "superficial"
official investigation that amounted to a denial of the applicant's right to a
domestic remedy for her complaint,372
<;akici, TimurtQ§, and <;i~ek indicate that the Court is expanding its
analyses of "disappearance" cases by presuming detentions and subsequent
deaths through increased reliance on circumstantial evidence provided by
witnesses as opposed to the formal requirements elucidated in earlier cases.
Whereas McCann and Kaya only initiated an Article 2 required
investigation upon the use of fatal force by a government agent, 373 the
<;akici line of cases indicates that government liability can be found both in
responsibility for presumed deaths as well as by failing to investigate
complaints even in the absence of a dead body.374 Also, the <;akici line of
cases indicates that disappearances and detentions can be proven in the
absence of official custody records and based largely on witness testimony.
365. Jd. ~ 125-32, at 24-25 (outlining the conflicting versions of facts and finding the
applicant's witnesses to be consistent, whereas government witnesses were not, and concluding that the
alleged operation and detention of the sons had occurred).
366. Jd. "I 138, at 26.
367. Jd. "I 139, at 27.
368. Jd. "I 146-47, at 29 (noting that six and a half years had passed since the disappearance of
the sons).
369. Jd., 146, at 29 (citing Timurl~ and Kilif in noting the possibility that an unacknowledged
detention could result in death and that ineffective enforcement of criminal laws in the area fostered
government unaccountability).
370. Jd. "I 147, at 29.
371. Jd. "I ISO, at 30.
372. Jd." 18(}-81, at 37.
373. See supra Part V.A (discussing McCann and Kayo).
374. The Court's reasoning in the (:akici line of cases has continued in Orhan v. Turkey, App.
No. 25656/94, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2002), available 01 http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2iHEJUDIl00211/
orhano/02Q-%2025656jv.chbl%2018062002e.doc (last visited Nov. II, 2003). In Orha/l, Turkey was
again found to be in violation of Article 2 after the Court presumed the deaths of several "disappeared"
individuals following an "unacknowledged detention." Jd. "330-32, at 59-60.
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The expansion of the analysis and evidentiary focus are appropriate
considering that the core purpose of a state-fostered "disappearance" is to
remove, and presumably kill, perceived enemies of the state with no
evidence left behind. Particularly where alleged, government-directed
disappearances occur on a frequent basis, and official responses suggest a
pattern of inadequate investigation, the Court is also correct to include in its
analyses the existence of inadequate state protection for persons in its
jurisdiction that contribute to a general unaccountability for the actions of
government forces.
VI. IMPLICAnONS FOR CHECHEN CLAIMS
The facts of Khashiyev and Akayeva differ from those elucidated in the
Turkish cases discussed earlier. However, the Court should rule in favor of
the applicants and charge Russia with violations of both Convention
Articles 2 and 13.
The (:akici line of cases indicates that the Court will rely on witness
testimony to show that alleged victims were taken into custody by
authorities.37S In Khashiyev and Akayeva, Human Rights Watch reported
that a single witness allegedly saw Russian soldiers beat and then detain the
three men who were later found killed.376 Furthermore, the same witness
saw the soldiers shoot the wounded woman in the wheelbarrow,377 an event
also corroborated by soldier's statements allegedly made to two other
witnesses the next day,~78 and the wounded woman's body was found in a
wheelbarrow with a shot to the head. 379 The Court's investigation may
reveal other witnesses who can either corroborate or contradict these
reports.380
375. See supra Part V.D (discussing <;akici, Timur~, and <;i~ek).
376. Civilian Killings, supra note 227 ("According to a witness at the scene who later spoke to




On January 20 at about 4 p.m., a tall young conscript soldier came to the house of
"Wakha R." (not his real name) and "Sultan P." (not his real name), and told the
men that he had killed a wounded woman in a wheelbarrow, and that he would
now kill them also. When the two men asked the soldier why he had killed the
woman, he replied that she had begged, "Help me, I am freezing," and the soldier
had walked over to her, said "I will help you," and shot her.
Id
379. Id. (describing the daughter's alleged discovery of her mother's dead body).
380. Following the submission of claims by an applicant, the factual investigation and resolution
of the case by the Court may take several years. See supra Parts V.A-D (describing cases in which
holdings were announced years after the claims were submitted).
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Regardless of whether detention of the three men is presumed to have
occurred or not, however, and in the absence of other evidence, a question
of fact exists as to how the men were killed. One possibility would be, as
the applicants allege, that some form of arrest occurred by Russian soldiers,
who then tortured and killed the men.381 Another possibility would be, as
the government alleges, that no arrest occurred and instead Chechens or
criminals killed the men, or similarly, if Russian forces did arrest the men,
they were later released and then killed by Chechens or criminals.382 The
only undisputed fact is that the three men were found dead.383 Certainly, if
it can be shown that they were detained and both tortured and killed, an
Article 3 violation-as indicated by Tomasi and Ribitsc~would apply, as
would an Article 2 violation of the right to life.
In the absence of other evidence that would either establish custody or
identify persons involved in their deaths, it would be difficult for the Court
to hold Russia accountable for an Article 2 violation assigning it direct
responsibility for their deaths beyond a reasonable doubt. 384 However,
harking to the Court's recent rulings in Cakici and related cases, a
consideration of circumstantial evidence and overall political context
should be considered in an Article 2 analysis,385 and may persuade the
Court to find against Russia's claim of innocence. Such evidence would
include statements allegedly made to witnesses by vengeful Russian
soldiers indicating a willingness to kill Chechen civilians,386 reports that
soldiers committed numerous atrocities against Chechen civilians in that
district of Grozny at the same period of time,387 and frequent occurrences of
other human rights violations committed by Russian military forces during
381. See Khashiyev & Akayeva Admissibility, supra note 215, at 2-4.
382. ld. at 6.
383. ld.
384. See Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276194, 1998-III Eur. Ct H.R.' 107, at 28 (1998) (noting
that an Article 2 violation requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to detennine if an actor has taken a
person's life), available at hnp:/lhudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc2lHEJUD/19990 IlKurt%20batj.doc (last
visited Dec. 2, 2003).
385. See supra Part V.D (discussing the Court's willingness to take into consideration
circumstantial evidence and defects which foster a sense ofgovernment unaccountability in the cases of
C;akici, Timurt~, and C;ir;ek).
386. See Civilian Killings, supra note 227 (reporting statements allegedly made by Russian
soldiers indicating a desire to seek revenge on Chechens for the deaths incurred in the battle for
Gromy).
387. See id. (documenting allegations of atrocities committed by Russian soldiers in
Staropromyslovski within days of their entrance into Gromy); see also Press Release, Human Rights
Watch, More than Sixty Civilians Murdered in Chechen Capital: "Pattern" of Summary Executions
Emerging (Feb. 23, 2000) (listing the names ofover fifty civilians who were allegedly killed by Russian
soldiers in three districts of Gromy), available at http://www.hrw.org/pressl2000/02lchech0223.htrn
(last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
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operations in general throughout Chechnya.388 Consideration of the overall
context in which the alleged violations occurred is appropriate assuming
that in such an environment, the potential exists for such violations to be
committed with impunity. As Calcici and its line of cases indicate, an
atmosphere that fosters a lack of accountability for the actions of
government agents should be considered in an Article 2 analysis.389 Thus,
in this context, the Court should place great weight on witness testimony
and the overall climate of the situation.
Even if Article 2 liability assessing direct responsibility for the three
deaths cannot be concluded, an Article 2 violation should be found for the
government's failure to properly investigate the cases in a prompt and
thorough manner. As alleged by the applicants in Khashiyev and Akayeva,
and noted in the Court's admissibility decision, the government failed to
promptly examine a variety of items constituting material evidence in the
three men's deaths, and to disclose details of criminal investigations.390 For
these same reasons, an Article 13 violation for failing to provide an
effective remedy should also be found, as an "arguable complaint" can
likely be determined to exist.391 Even though it may have been difficult for
the government to provide such a remedy to civilians given the
circumstances in Chechnya at that time, the government is not absolved of
this requirement. Rather, these facts increase the burden on Russia to
provide aggrieved parties with effective procedures, considering the
possibility that the very lack of procedures would encourage Convention
violations without fear ofofficial retaliation.
These contextual circumstances supporting an Article 13 violation also
carry weight in determining potential standing issues. In Akdivar, the
government of Turkey alleged that the applicants had failed to exhaust
domestic remedies before petitioning the ECHR. 392 Similarly, in the
Khashiyev and Akayeva admissibility decision, Russia asserts that the
Chechen applicants failed to comply with this requirement of the
388. See supra Parts II.A-C (outlining several reported human rights violations allegedly
'committed by Russian forces in Chechnya).
389. See supra Part V.D and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the Court considered
defects in criminal law protections that fostered government unaccountability a factor to be considered
in Article 2 charges).
390. See Khashiyev & Akayeva Admissibility, supra note 215, at 8-9 (noting the applicants'
assertions that articles of clothing were not gathered by investigators, procedural requirements of
Russia's criminal code were not complied with, and the cases were continuously stalled).
391. See supra Part V.C (discussing cases in which Article 13 requires governments to provide
an effective domestic remedy in theory and practice to aggrieved parties if an "arguable complaint" can
be said to exist).
392. Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893193, 1996-1V Eur. Ct H.R. , 56 (1996), available al
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intJHudocldocJHEJUD/sift/650.txt(lastvisitedNov.ll, 2003).
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Convention.393 Yet at the same time, Russia acknowledged the overall lack
of any effective judicial system in Chechnya during that period of the
war.394 Akdivar releases the requirement that applicants exhaust domestic
remedies when there is an absence of appropriate mechanisms to address
grievances and provide remedies, and where the factual circumstances
compel a conclusion that the de facto government practices violate the
Convention in such a manner that pursuing any remedies against
government agents is basically "futile."m This rationale is correct, because
the absence of official protections and processes for civilians to obtain
effective remedies in a zone of conflict cannot justify impunity for war
crimes. To argue so would ultimately undennine the very reason for the
existence of war-crimes laws and human-rights guarantees in times of
conflict.
Khashiyev, Alcayeva, and the remaining cases recently declared
admissible by the Court will most likely only be the beginning of claims
against the Russian government originating from the war in Chechnya.
Factual details will certainly vary in future cases, as they do in the series of
cases that charge the government of Turkey with breaches of human rights.
If the cases involving Turkey are any indication, claims against Russia for
its actions in Chechnya will likely also revolve around alleged violations of
Articles 2 and 13, at least, and possibly Articles 3, 5, 6, and others as
well. 396 As previously noted, member-nations have generally complied
with Court rulings,397 which have often included a demand that respondent
states violating the Convention pay compensation to petitioners.398 This has
393. Khoshiyev & Akayeva Admissibility, supra note 215, at 14 (noting Russia's argument that
the applicants had not exhausted all domestic remedies and thus do not have standing before the Court).
394. See it/. (noting Russia's acknowledgement that an effective government Court system in the
Chechen Republic was basically non-existent at the time the complaints originated).
395. Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93, 1996-1V Eur. Ct. H.R. '1[67.
396. Article 5 protects the "Right to liberty and security" and Article 6 protects the "Right to a
fair trial." Convention for Human Rights, supra note 89, art. 5,6. In several of the Turkish cases, the
Court found that the government violated Article 5 by holding individuals in unacknowledged detention.
See <;i~k v. Turkey, App. No. 25704194, Eur. Ct. H.R. '\I'll 168-69, at 34 (2001), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc''IoSChedec%5Csift%5C2580.txt (last visited Mar. 6, 2004);
Tim~ v. Turkey, App. No. 23531/94, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ft 106, at 26 (2000), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2lHEJUDl2oo207/Timurtas.batj.doc(lastvisitedNov.ll, 2003).
397. See supra notes 188-92, 201 and accompanying text (noting the general record of
compliance among member nations with decisions of the Court).
398. Austria Violated Rights ofAnti-Haider Paper: EU Rights Court, AGENCE FRANCE PREsSE,
Feb. 26, 2002 (reporting that Austria was ordered to pay $14,700 for violating free speech rights),
available at LEXIS, News & Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File;
Council ofEurope Says London Must Allow Elections in Gibraltar, AGENCE FRANCE PREsSE, Jun. 26,
2001 (reporting that the United Kingdom was ordered to pay $64,000 for not guaranteeing residents of
Gibraltar the right to vote in European Parliament elections), available at LEXIS, News & Business,
Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File; Cyprus Says It Will Pay EU Human
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certainly included compensation paid to applicants in cases such as (:i~ek,
Timurt~, and (:akici, for violating Articles 2, 13, and others.399 In 2001,
the Court fined Turkey two and a half million British Pounds for a military
engagement against Kurds which resulted in multiple civilian deaths and
destruction of property, which Turkey, in its bid to enter the European
Union, agreed to pay.400
Certainly, money is no substitution for the lives of victims of
extrajudicial killings, or compensation for years of brutal and excessive
military force used in Chechnya. The aggregation of monetary fines
imposed upon Russia, assuming that the Court rules against Russia for
Convention violations as it has against Turkey in its conflict with the Kurds,
may ultimately pressure Russian authorities to provide greater disciplinary
and judicial procedures in the future. This would be a significant
development, as not only are there indications that human rights abuses are
continuing in Chechnya with impunity,40I but they may actually be
spreading to neighboring republics as well.402
Indeed, the Council of Europe should seriously consider the use of
mechanisms including, and in addition to, individual ECHR judgments for
continuing Convention violations allegedly committed by Russia. Already,
the rapporteur for the Council of Europe's parliamentary legal affairs and
human rights committee has suggested the possibility that an international
war-crimes tribunal be created for human rights violations in Chechnya
Rights Fine to Turkish Cypriot, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 22, 2000 (reporting that Cyprus was
ordered to pay $15,370 for mistreating a suspected drug trafficker), available at LEXIS, News &
Business, Country & Region, Europe, News, European News Sources File.
399. See 9i~ek, App. No. 25704/94, Eur. Ct. H.R.1f1f 198-209, at 40-41 (assessing and ordering
damages and compensation for court costs and expenses); Timurta~, App. No. 23531/94, Eur. Ct. H.R.
W127-28, 131, at 31-32 (same); <;:akici v. Turkey, App. No. 23657/94, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 'rJ 122-
33, at 31-34 (1999) (same), available at hnp:/lhudoc.echr.coe.intlHudoc2doc2IHEJUD/200105/
cakici%20%20batj%20-%2023657jv.gc%2008079ge.doc (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
400. See Cloudy Forecast/or Turkey, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE (Cairo), June 21-27, 2001
(noting a "record" high fine assessed against Turkey for a 1993 military engagement, and tensions
between Turkey and the EU over Turkey's human rights record), available at
http://weekly.ahram.org.egI2001/539/re9.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
401. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.N. Should Censure Russia over Chechnya
Abuses: Three "Disappearances" a Week Documented (Apr. 10, 2003) (noting continuing reports of
alleged extrajudicial killings and torture of civilians in Chechnya by Russian forces), available at
http://www.hrw.orgipress/2003/04/unchrll41003.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
402. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Russia: Abuses Spread Beyond Chechnya:
Neighboring Ingushetia Now Affected (July 16, 2003) (noting coneem that "[i]n Ingushetia, Russian
forces are showing the same patterns of brutal behavior that we've seen in Chechnya"), available at
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similar to the International Criminal Tribunal for the fonner Yugoslavia.403
Russia's continued membership in the Council of Europe and any potential
accession to the European Union should be strongly considered.
The commitment to democracy and human rights serves as the stated
foundation for Council of Europe membership and its raison d'etre. 404
Given these principles, military force amounting to state-directed terrorism
perpetuated on a massive scale amounts to just as much, if not more, of a
threat to democracy, than terrorist crimes committed by non-state actors.405
For the Chechen victims of torture, disappearances, and killings, the
ongoing situation is both grim and urgent. For now, the European Court of
Human Rights may be Chechnya's last chance.
403. BINDlG, supra note 116, § II, ~ 3 (suggesting the creation of an international war crimes
tribunal for human rights violations in Chechnya if "efforts to bring to justice those guilty of human
rights abuses are not intensified").
404. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text (discussing the guiding principles of
Council of Europe accession).
405. See Gt!rard Soulier, Terrorism, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IS, 15-16 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., Christine Chodkiewicz trans., 1992) (discussing
"terrorism" and asserting that "it is in fact the response to terrorism which is the true threat to
democracy").
